Experimental Economics by Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt

























  As  with  most  science,  economics  is  observational;  economic  theories  are 
devised to explain market activity.  Economists have developed an impressive and 
technically sophisticated array of models, but the capacity to evaluate their predictive 
content  has  lagged.    Traditionally,  economic  theories  have  been  evaluated  with 
statistical  data  from  existing  “natural”  markets.    Although  econometricians  are 
sometimes able to untangle the effects of interrelated variables of interest, natural 
data  often  fail  to  allow  “critical  tests”  of  theoretical  propositions,  because 
distinguishing historical circumstances occur only by chance.  Moreover, even when 
such circumstances occur, they are usually surrounded by a host of confounding 
extraneous  factors.    These  problems  have  become  more  severe  as  models  have 
become more precise and intricate.  In game theory, for example, predictions are 
often based on very subtle behavioral assumptions for which there is little practical 
possibility of obtaining evidence from naturally occurring markets. 
  As a consequence of these data problems, economists have often been forced 
to  evaluate  theories  on  the  basis  of  plausibility,  or  on  intrinsic  factors  such  as 
elegance and internal consistency.  The contrast between the confidence economists 
place in precise economic models and the apparent chaos of natural data can be 
supremely  frustrating  to  scientists  in  other  fields.    Biologist  Paul  Ehrlich,  for 
example, comments: “The trouble is that economists are trained in ways that make 4                                                                                                               CHAPTER 1 
 
them utterly clueless about the way the world works.  Economists think that the 
world works by magic.”
1 
  Other observational sciences have overcome the obstacles inherent in the use 
of naturally occurring data by systematically collecting data in controlled, laboratory 
conditions.  Fundamental propositions of astronomy, for example, are founded on 
propositions from particle physics, which have been painstakingly evaluated in the 
laboratory.    Although  the  notion  is  somewhat  novel  in  economics,  there  is  no 
inherent reason why relevant economic data cannot also be obtained from laboratory 
experiments.
2   
  The systematic evaluation of economic theories under controlled laboratory 
conditions is a relatively recent development.  Although the theoretical analysis of 
market  structures  was  initiated  in  the  late  1700s  and  early  1800s  by  the  path-
breaking  insights  of  Adam  Smith  and  Augustine  Cournot,  the  first  market 
experiments did not occur until the mid-twentieth century.  Despite this late start, the 
use  of  experimental  methods  to  evaluate  economic  propositions  has  become 
increasingly  widespread  in  the  last  twenty  years  and  has  come  to  provide  an 
important foundation for bridging the gap between economic theory and observation. 
 Although  no  panacea,  laboratory  techniques  have  the  important  advantages  of 
imposing professional responsibility on data collection, and of allowing more direct 
tests  of  behavioral  assumptions.    Given  the  ever-growing  intricacy  of  economic 
models,  we  believe  that  economics  will  increasingly  become  an  experimental 
science.
3 
  This monograph reviews the principal contributions of experimental research 
to  economics.    We  also  attempt  to  provide  some  perspective  on  the  general 
usefulness of laboratory methods in economics.  As with any new mode of analysis, 
experimental research in economics is surrounded by a series of methodological 
controversies.    Therefore,  procedural  and  design  issues  that  are  necessary  for 
effective experimentation are covered in detail.  Discussion of these issues also helps 
to frame some of the ongoing debates. 
  This first chapter is intended to serve as an introduction to the remainder of the 
book, and as such it covers a variety of preliminary issues.  We begin the discussion 
with  a  brief  history  of  economics  experiments  in  section  1.2,  followed  by  a 
                                                 
     
1  Personal communication with the authors. 
     
2  The general perception is that economics is not an experimental science and, consequently, that it is       
2  The general perception is that economics is not an experimental science and, consequently, that it is 
somewhat speculative.  The Encyclopedia Britannica (1991, p. 395) presents this view: “Economists are 
sometimes confronted with the charge that their discipline is not a science.  Human behavior, it is said, 
cannot be analyzed with the same objectivity as the behavior of atoms and molecules.  Value judgements, 
philosophical preconceptions, and ideological biases must interfere with the attempt to derive conclusions 
that are independent of the particular economist espousing them.  Moreover, there is no laboratory in 
which economists can test their hypotheses.”  (This quotation was suggested to us by Hinkelmann, 1990.) 
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description of a simple market experiment in section 1.3.  The three subsequent 
sections  address  methodological  and  procedural  issues:  Section  1.4  discusses  
advantages  and  limitations  of  laboratory  methods,  section  1.5  considers  various 
objectives of laboratory research, and section 1.6 reviews some desirable methods 
and procedures.  The final two sections are written to give the reader a sense of this 
book's organization.  One of the most prominent lessons of laboratory research is the 
importance  of  trading  rules  and  institutions  to  market  outcomes.    Much  of  our 
discussion  revolves  around  the  details  of  alternative  trading  institutions.  
Consequently,  section  1.7  categorizes  some  commonly  used  institutional 
arrangements.    Section  1.8  previews  the  remaining  chapters.    The  chapter  also 
contains  an  appendix,  which  consists  of  two  parts:    The  first  part  contains 
instructions for a simple “double-auction” market, while the second part contains a 
detailed  list  of  tasks  to  be  completed  in  setting  up  and  administering  a  market 
experiment.  This checklist serves as a primer on how to conduct an experiment; it 
provides  a  practical,  step-by-step  implementation  of  the  general  procedural 
recommendations that are discussed earlier in the chapter. 
   Prior to proceeding, we would like encourage both the new student and the 
experienced  experimentalist  to  read  this  first  chapter  carefully.    It  introduces 
important  procedural  and  design  considerations,  and  it  provides  a  structure  for 
organizing subsequent insights. 
 
 
1.2 A Brief History of Experimental Economics 
   
  In  the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s,  a  number  of  economists  independently 
became  interested  in  the  notion  that  laboratory  methods  could  be  useful  in 
economics.  Early interests ranged widely, and the literature evolved in three distinct 
directions.  At one extreme, Edward Chamberlin (1948) presented subjects with a 
streamlined  version  of  a  natural  market.    The  ensuing  literature  on  market 
experiments focused on the predictions of neoclassical price theory.  A second strand 
of experimental literature grew out of interest in testing the behavioral implications 
of  noncooperative  game  theory.    These  game  experiments  were  conducted  in 
environments that less closely resembled natural markets.  Payoffs, for example, 
were often given in a tabular (normal) form that suppresses much of the cost and 
demand structure of an economic market but facilitates the calculation of game-
theoretic  equilibrium  outcomes.    A  third  series  of  individual  decision-making 
experiments focused on yet simpler environments, where the only uncertainty is due 
to exogenous random events, as opposed to the decisions of other agents.  Interest in 
individual  decision-making  experiments  grew  from  a  desire  to  examine  the 
behavioral  content  of  the  axioms  of  expected  utility  theory.  Although the lines 
separating these literatures have tended to fade somewhat over time, it is useful for 
purposes of perspective to consider them separately.  




  Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (A Re-orientation of the 
Theory of Value), first published in 1933, was motivated by the apparent failure of 
markets to perform adequately during the Depression.  Chamberlin believed that 
certain predictions of his theories could be tested (at least heuristically) in a simple 
market environment, using only graduate students as economic agents. 
  Chamberlin reported the first market experiment in 1948.  He induced the 
demand and cost structure in this market by dealing a deck of cards, marked with 
values  and  costs,  to  student  subjects.    Through  trading,  sellers  could  earn  the 
difference between the cost they were dealt and the contract price they negotiated.  
Similarly, buyers could earn the difference between the value they were dealt and 
their  negotiated  contract  price.  Earnings  in  Chamberlin's  experiment  were 
hypothetical, but to the extent his students were motivated by hypothetical earnings, 
this process creates a very specific market structure.  A student receiving a seller 
card  with  a  cost  of  $1.00,  for  example, would have a perfectly inelastic supply 
function with a “step” at $1.00.  This student would be willing to supply one unit at 
any price over $1.00.  Similarly, a student receiving a buyer card with a value of 
$2.00 would have a perfectly inelastic demand at any price below $2.00.   
  Sellers and buyers received different costs and values, so the individual supply 
and demand functions had the same rectangular shapes, but with steps at differing 
heights.  Under these conditions a market supply function is generated by ranking 
individual costs from lowest to highest and then summing horizontally across the 
sellers.  Similarly, a market demand function is generated by ranking individual 
valuations from highest to lowest and summing across the buyers.  Competitive price 
and quantity predictions follow from the intersection of market supply and demand 
curves.  
  Trading in these markets was both unregulated and essentially unstructured.  
Students were permitted to circulate freely around the classroom to negotiate with 
others in a decentralized manner.  Despite this “competitive” structure, Chamberlin 
concluded that outcomes systematically deviated from competitive predictions.  In 
particular,  he  noted  that  the  transactions  quantity  was  greater  than  the  quantity 
determined by the intersection of supply and demand.  
   Chamberlin's results were initially ignored in the literature.  In fact, Chamberlin 
himself all but ignored them.
4  Given the novelty of the laboratory method, this is 
perhaps not surprising.   But Vernon Smith, who had participated in Chamberlin's 
initial experiment as a Harvard graduate student, became intrigued by the method.   
He felt that Chamberlin's interpretations of the results were misleading in a way that 
could  be  demonstrated  in  a  classroom  market.    Smith  conjectured  that  the 
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decentralized trading that occurred as students wandered around the room was not 
the  appropriate  institutional  setting  for  testing  the  received  theories  of  perfect 
competition.  As an alternative, Smith (1962, 1964) devised a laboratory “double 
auction”  institution  in  which  all  bids,  offers,  and  transactions  prices  are  public 
information.    He  demonstrated  that  such  markets  could  converge  to  efficient, 
competitive  outcomes,  even  with  a  small  number  of  traders  who  initially  knew 
nothing about market conditions.   
  Although  Smith's  support  for  the  predictions  of  competitive  price  theory 
generated  little  more  initial  interest  among  economists  than  did  Chamberlin's 
rejections, Smith began to study the effects of changes in trading institutions on 
market outcomes.  Subsequent work along these lines has focused on the robustness 





  A second sequence of experimental studies was produced in the 1950s and 
1960s by psychologists, game-theorists, and business-school economists, most of 
whom  were  initially  interested  in  behavior  in  the  context  of  the  well-known 
“prisoner's dilemma,” apparently first articulated by Tucker (1950).
6  The problem is 
as follows:  Suppose that two alleged partners in crime, prisoner A and prisoner B, 
are placed in private rooms and are given the opportunity to confess.  If only one of 
them confesses and turns state's evidence, the other receives a seven-year sentence, 
and  the  prisoner  who  confesses  only  serves  one  year  as  an  accessory.    If  both 
confess,  however,  they  each  serve  five-year  terms.    If  neither  confesses,  each 
receives a maximum two-year penalty for a lesser crime.  In matrix form, these 
choices are represented in figure 1.1, where the sentences are shown as negative 
numbers since they represent time lost.  All boldfaced entries in the figure pertain to 
prisoner B.  The ordered pair of numbers in each box corresponds to the sentences 
for prisoners A and B, respectively.  For example, when B confesses and A does not, 
the payoff entry  (–7, –1)  indicates that the sentences are seven years for A and one 
year for B. 
  This game presents an obvious problem.  Both prisoners would be better off if 
neither confessed, but each, aware of each other's  incentives to confess  in  any case, 
“should”  confess.   Sociologists  and  social psychologists,  initially  unconvinced  
                                                 
     
5  A separate line of experimentation began in the mid-1970s when Charles Plott, who had previously 
been on the faculty with Vernon Smith at Purdue University, realized that Smith's procedures could be 
adapted  to  create  public  goods  and  committee  voting  processes  in  the  laboratory.    The  subsequent 
political science and economics literature on voting experiments is surveyed in McKelvey and Ordeshook 
(1990).   
     
6  See Roth (1988) for a discussion of how Tucker came to publish his note on the prisoner's 
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that humans would reason themselves to a jointly undesirable outcome, initiated a 
voluminous literature examining the determinants of cooperation and defection when 
subjects make simultaneous decisions in prisoner's-dilemma experiments.
7 
   The  standard  duopoly  pricing  problem  is  an  immediate  application  of  the 
prisoner's dilemma: although collusion would make each duopolist better off than 
competition, each seller has an incentive to defect from a cartel.  For this reason, the 
psychologists' work on the prisoner's dilemma was paralleled by classic studies of 
cooperation and competition in oligopoly situations by Sauerman and Selten (1959), 
Siegel and Fouraker (1960), and Fouraker and Siegel (1963).  As a consequence, 
economists  became  interested  in  oligopoly  games  that  were  motivated  by  more 
complex market environments (e.g., Dolbear et al., 1968, and Friedman, 1963, 1967, 
and 1969).  In particular, the interdisciplinary approach at graduate business schools 
such as Carnegie-Mellon's Graduate School of Industrial Administration led to a 
series  of  experimental  papers, including an early survey paper (Cyert and Lave, 
1965)  and  an  experimental  thesis  on  various  aspects  of  oligopoly  behavior 
(Sherman, 1966).  Much of the more recent literature pertains to the predictions of 
increasingly complex applications of game theory, but always in environments that 
are simple and well specified enough so that the implications of the theory can be 




  A third branch of literature focused on individual behavior in simple situations 
in  which  strategic  behavior  is  unnecessary  and  individuals  need  only  optimize.  
                                                 
     
7  Coleman (1983) lists some 1,500 experimental investigations of the prisoner's-dilemma game.   
Particularly insightful early studies include Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and Lave (1962, 1965). 
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These experiments were generally designed to evaluate tenets of the basic theory of 
choice under uncertainty, as formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
and Savage (1954).  
  In experiments of this type, subjects must choose between uncertain prospects 
or “lotteries.”  A lottery is simply a probability distribution over prizes, for example, 
$2.00  if  heads  and  $1.00  if  tails.    A  subject  who makes a choice between two 
lotteries decides which lottery will be used to determine (in a random manner) the 
subject's  earnings.    Many  of  these  experiments  are  designed  to  produce  clean 
counter-examples to basic axioms of expected utility theory.  For example, consider 
the  controversial  “independence  axiom.”    Informally,  this  axiom  states  that  the 
choice between two lotteries, X and Y, is independent of the presence or absence of a 
common  (and  hence  “irrelevant”)  lottery  Z.    This  axiom  could  be  tested  by 
presenting  participants  with  two  lotteries,  X  and  Y.    If  participants  indicate  a 
preference for X over Y, the experimenter could subsequently determine whether a 
50/50 chance of X and some third lottery Z is preferred to a 50/50 chance of Y and Z. 
 Numerous,  consistent  violations  of  this  axiom  have  been  observed  through 
questioning of this sort.
8   This research has generated a lively debate and has led  to 
efforts to devise a more general decision theory that is not contradicted by observed 
responses. 
  Not all individual decision-making problems involve expected-utility theory.  
May (1954), for example, systematically elicited intransitive choices over a series of 
riskless alternatives.  Other prominent examples, to be discussed later in the text, 
include  a  series  of  experiments  designed  to  evaluate  the  rationality  of  subjects' 
forecasts of market prices (Williams, 1987) and tests of the behavioral content of 
optimal  stopping  rules  in  sequential  search  problems  (Schotter  and  Braunstein, 
1981).  Experiments testing Slutsky-Hicks consumption theory have been carried out 
with humans (Battalio et al., 1973) and rats (Kagel et al., 1975).  Incentives for rats 
were denominated in terms of the number of food pellets they received for a given 
number of lever presses.  Some rat subjects exhibited a backward-bending labor 




1.3 A Simple Design for a Market Experiment 
 
  Before discussing procedures and different kinds of experiments,  it is useful  
to present a concrete example of an experiment.   For simplicity, we consider a 
market experiment.   We first discuss a market design, or the supply and demand 
arrays  induced  in  a  specific  market.    Subsequently,  we  discuss  the  empirical 
consequences of a variety of theoretic predictions in this design and then report the 
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results of a short market session.  The market involves six buyers, denoted B1 . . . 
B6, and six sellers, denoted S1 . . . S6.  Each agent may make a maximum of two 
trades.  In each trade, sellers earn an amount equal to the difference between the 
trading price and their cost for the unit.   Conversely, buyers earn the difference 
between their unit value and the trading price.    In this way, a unit value represents a 
maximum willingness to pay for a unit,  and a unit cost is a minimum willingness    
to accept.  
  Individual cost and valuation arrays for sellers and buyers are given in table 
1.1.  Each buyer has a high-value unit and a low-value unit (except for B1, who has 
constant  values).    Providing  buyers  with  multiple  units  but  restricting  them  to 
purchase  the  highest-valued  unit  first  implements  an  assumption  that  individual 
demand is downward sloping.  Horizontally summing across individual demands 
generates the downward-sloping market demand schedule illustrated in figure 1.2.  
Note, for example, that the highest value in table 1.1 is $1.90 for B6.  This generates 
the highest step on the left side of the demand function in figure 1.2.  The labels on 
the steps in the figure indicate the identity of the buyer with a value at that step.  
Symmetrically, sellers in table 1.1 each have a low-cost unit and a high-cost unit.  
Requiring sellers to sell the lower-cost unit first induces upward-sloping individual 
supply functions.  Summing across individual supplies creates the market supply 
schedule illustrated in figure 1.2. 
  It is clear from figure 1.2 that the predicted competitive price is between $1.30 
and $1.40, and the predicted competitive quantity is 7.  A third measure of market 
performance,  surplus,  is  generated  via  trading,  as  buyers  and  sellers  execute 




Table 1.1  Parameters for a Laboratory Market 
  Buyers' Values 
 
    Sellers' Costs 
Buyer  Unit 1  Unit 2    Seller  Unit 1  Unit 2 
B1  1.40  1.40    S1  1.30  1.40 
B2  1.50  1.30    S2  1.20  1.50 
B3  1.60  1.20    S3  1.10  1.60 
B4  1.70  1.10    S4  1.00  1.70 
B5  1.80  1.00    S5  .90  1.80 
B6  1.90  .90    S6  .80  1.30 
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units, then the surplus created is $.80 ($1.60 – $.80).  The maximum possible surplus 
that can be extracted from trade is $3.70, which is the area between the supply and 
demand curves to the left of their intersection.  These predictions are summarized in 
the left-most column of table 1.2.   
  Efficiency,  measured  as  the  percentage  of  the  maximum  possible  surplus 
extracted, is shown in the fourth row of the table.  Competitive price theory predicts 
(in  the  absence  of  externalities  and  other  imperfections)  that  trading  maximizes 
possible  gains from exchange, and thus, predicted efficiency for the competitive 
theory is 100 percent.
9   Finally, the available surplus could be distributed in a 
variety of ways, depending on the contracts made in the sequence of trades.  Suppose 
B3 and S6 strike the contract as just mentioned for a price of $1.30.  At this price, 
$.30 of the created surplus goes to B3 ($1.60 – $1.30), while $.50 of the surplus 
goes to S6 ($1.30 – $.80).  The distribution of this surplus would be just reversed if 
the contract was struck at a price of $1.10.   Under competitive conditions, the 
surplus  should  be  distributed  roughly  equally  among  buyers  and  sellers  in  this 
design.    If  prices  were  exactly  in  the  middle  of  the  competitive  range,  then  50 
percent of the surplus would go to the buyers and 50 percent to the sellers.   As 
indicated by the “~” marks in the bottom  two entries  in  the  Perfect Competition  
 
                                                 
     
9  Some aspects of the efficiency concept are discussed in section 3.2 of chapter 3. 
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column,  however, deviations from the 50/50 split are consistent with a competitive 
outcome, due to the range of competitive prices in this design. 
  To  evaluate  the  results  of  an  experiment,  it  is  useful  to  consider  some  
alternative theories.  If students in an economics class are given the value and cost 
information in table 1.1 (but not the representation in figure 1.2) and are asked to 
provide a theory that predicts the price outcomes for double-auction trading, they 
commonly suggest procedures that involve calculating means or medians of values 
and costs.  If students are then shown figure 1.2 and asked to suggest alternatives to 
the theory of perfect competition, the suggestions are often couched in terms of 
maximization of one form or another.  Perhaps the three most frequently suggested 
theories  are  (a)  maximization  of  combined  sellers'  profits,  (b)  maximization  of 
combined buyers' earnings, and (c) maximization of the number of units that can be 
traded at no loss to either party.
10 
  The predictions of these three alternative theories are summarized in the three 
columns on the right side of table 1.2.  Consider the predictions listed under the 
Monopoly column in the table.  Assuming that units sell at a uniform price, the 
profit-maximizing monopoly price is $1.60, and four units will trade in a period.  
This yields a total revenue of $6.40   (four times $1.60).   The least expensive way  
of producing four units is to use the “first units” of sellers S3-S6, for a total cost of 
$3.80  ($0.80 + $0.90 + $1.00 + $1.10).  The resulting profit is the difference 
between revenue and cost, which is $2.60.
11  Buyers' surplus at the monopoly price is 
only $0.60  ($0.30 for B6, $0.20 for B5, and $0.10 for B4).   Total surplus is the  
sum of sellers' profits and buyers' surplus; this sum is $3.20,  which is 87 percent     
of the maximum possible gains from trade ($3.70) that could be extracted from the 
market.  Sellers will earn roughly 81 percent of that surplus (or the area between 
$1.60 and the supply curve for the first four units in figure 1.2).
12 The symmetric 
predictions  of  buyer  surplus  maximization  are  summarized  in  the  monopsony 
column of table 1.2.  Finally, consider quantity maximization as a predictor.  From a 
reexamination of table 1.1 it is clear that this design has the interesting feature that a 
maximum of twelve profitable trades can be made in a period, if all trades take   
                                                 
     
10  In our experience, economics students offer these theories more frequently than the (surplus-
maximizing) model of perfect competition, which appears in all of their textbooks. 
     
11  It can be verified that this is the monopoly price by constructing a marginal revenue curve.  
Alternatively, consider profits at nearby prices:  Raising the price to $1.70 decreases sales to three units 
and profits to $2.40.  Lowering the price to $1.50 increases sales to five units, but profits fall to $2.50.  
Other prices are even less profitable. 
     
12  An  even  more  profitable  theory  of  seller  profit  maximization  is  that  sellers  perfectly  price 
discriminate by selling one unit at $1.90, one unit at $1.80, etc.  In this case, seven units trade, 100 
percent efficiency is extracted, and all earnings go to sellers.  A symmetric, cost-discrimination theory of 
buyer  earnings  maximization  is  also  possible.    These  theories  are  left  out  of  table  1.2  for  ease  of 
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place at different prices.
13  In each trade, a buyer and seller will negotiate over the 
ten-cent difference between supply and demand steps, so there is no point prediction 
about the price and surplus distribution.  Each trade generates a ten-cent surplus, so 
the total surplus is only $1.20, or about 32 percent of the maximum possible surplus. 
 In  order  for  twelve  units  to  be  traded,  prices  will  be  about  as  dispersed  as 
individuals' values and costs, as indicated by the range of “.80 to 1.90” in the right-




  We conducted a short market session using twelve student participants and the 
parameters  summarized  in  table  1.1.
14  The  session  consisted  of  two  “trading 
periods.”    At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  the  twelve  participants  were  each 
privately assigned one of the cost or valuation schedules listed in table 1.1.  Then 
they were given ten minutes to negotiate trades according to double-auction trading 
rules mentioned above:  sellers could call out offer prices, which could be accepted 
by any buyer, and buyers could call out bid prices, which could be accepted by any 
seller.  (The instructions used for this experiment are reproduced in appendix A1.1.) 
 The transactions prices for the first period are listed below in temporal order, with 
prices in the competitive range underlined. 
                                                 
     
13  Let Sij denote the jth unit of seller Si, etc.  Then twelve profitable trades can occur if they take 
place in the following order: S11 trades with B11, B21 with S12, S21 with B22, S22 with B31, S31 with B32, S32 
with B41, S41 with B42, S42 with B51, S51 with B52, S52 with B61, S61 with B62, and finally S62 with B12. 
     
14  Participants were fourth-year economics majors at the University of Virginia, and they were 
recruited from a small seminar class.  None of the subjects had previously participated in a laboratory 
market.  The session was conducted orally, with all prices recorded on the blackboard.  Earnings were 
paid in cash at the end of two periods. 
 
 
Table 1.2  Properties of Alternative Market Outcomes 








Price  1.30 to 1.40  1.60  1.10  .80 to 1.90 
Quantity  7  4  4  12 
Surplus  3.70  3.20  3.20  1.20 
Efficiency  100%  87%  87%  32% 
Buyers' Surplus  ~50%  19%  81%   –  
Sellers' Surplus  ~50%  81%  19%   –  14                                                                                                               CHAPTER 1 
 
   
Period 1:   $1.60, 1.50, 1.50, 1.35, 1.25, 1.39, 1.40.   
 
Participants calculated their earnings at the end of the first period, and then the 
market was opened for a second period of trading, which only lasted seven minutes.  
The transactions prices for the second period are: 
 
Period 2:   $1.35, 1.35, 1.40, 1.35, 1.40, 1.40, 1.35.  
 
Thus,  by  the  second  period,  outcomes  are  entirely  consistent  with  competitive 
predictions:  All transactions were in the competitive price range, and seven units 
sold.  The market was 100 percent efficient in both periods.  These competitive 
results are typical of those obtained with the parameterization in figure 1.2.  Notice 
that the number of traders was relatively small, and that no trader initially knew 
anything about supply and demand conditions for the market as a whole.
15 
 
1.4 Experimental Methods:  Advantages and Limitations 
 
  Each of the three literatures mentioned in section 1.2 has generated a body of 
findings using human subjects (usually college undergraduates) who make decisions 
in highly structured situations.  The skeptical reader might question what can be 
learned  about  complex  economic  phenomena  from  behavior  in  these  simple 
laboratory environments.  Although this issue arises repeatedly in later chapters, it is 
useful to present a brief summary of the pros and cons of experimentation at this 
time.   
  The  chief  advantages  offered  by  laboratory  methods  in  any  science  are 
replicability and control.  Replicability refers to the capacity of other researchers to 
reproduce  the  experiment,  and  thereby  verify  the  findings independently.
16 To a 
degree,  lack  of  replicability  is  a  problem  of  any  observational  inquiry  that  is 
nonexperimental; data from naturally occurring processes are recorded in a unique 
and  nonreplicated  spatial  and  temporal  background  in  which  other  unobserved 
factors are constantly changing.
17 The problem is complicated in economics because 
                                                 
     
15  If the demand and supply functions are more asymmetric, convergence to a stationary pattern of 
behavior typically involves more than two periods.  Chapter 3 considers some conditions under which 
convergence in double-auction markets is either slow or erratic. 
     
16  This notion of replication should be distinguished from the conventional use of the term in 
econometrics.  As Roth (1990) notes, the notion of replication in econometrics refers to the capacity to 
reproduce results with a given data set.  In an experimental context, replication is the capacity to create an 
entirely new set of observations. 
     
17  Laboratory observations, of course, also occur at spatially and temporally distinct locations, but 
laboratory procedures are implemented specifically to control for such effects.  With careful attention, the INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW                                                                               15 
 
the collection and independent verification of economic data are very expensive.  
Moreover, the economics profession imposes little professional credibility on the 
data-collection process, so economic data are typically collected not by economists 
for  scientific  purposes,  but  by  government  employees  or  businessmen  for  other 
purposes.  For this reason it is often difficult to verify the accuracy of field data.
18  
Better  data  from  naturally  occurring  markets  could  be  collected,  and  there  is 
certainly a strong case to be made for improvements in this area.  But relatively 
inexpensive,  independently  conducted  laboratory  investigations  allow  replication, 
which in turn provides professional incentives to collect relevant data carefully. 
   Control is the capacity to manipulate laboratory conditions so that observed 
behavior  can  be  used  to  evaluate  alternative  theories  and  policies.    In  natural 
markets, an absence of control is manifested in varying degrees.  Distinguishing 
natural data may sometimes exist in principle, but the data are either not collected or 
collected  too  imprecisely  to  distinguish  among  alternative  theories.    In  other 
instances, relevant data cannot be collected, because it is simply impossible to find 
economic situations that match the assumptions of the theory.  An absence of control 
in  natural  contexts  presents  critical  data  problems  in  many  areas  of  economic 
research.  In individual decision theory, for example, one would be quite surprised to 
observe many instances outside the laboratory where individuals face questions that 
directly test the axioms of expected utility theory.  The predictions of game theory 
are  also  frequently  difficult  to  evaluate  with natural data.  Many game-theoretic 
models exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria.  Game theorists frequently narrow the 
range of outcomes by dismissing some equilibria as being “unreasonable,” often on 
very  subtle  bases,  such  as  the  nature  of  beliefs  about  what  would  happen  in 
contingencies that are never realized during the equilibrium play of the game (beliefs 
“off of the equilibrium path”).  There is little hope that such issues can be evaluated 
with nonexperimental data.    
  Perhaps more surprising is the lack of control over data from natural markets 
sufficient to test even basic predictions of neoclassical price theory.  Consider, for 
example, the simple proposition that a market will generate efficient, competitive 
prices and quantities.  Evaluation of this proposition requires price, quantity, and 
market efficiency data, given a particular set of market demand and supply curves.  
But  neither  supply  nor  demand  may  be  directly  observed  with  natural  data.  
Sometimes cost data may be used to estimate supply, but the complexity of most 
markets  forces  some  parameter  measurements  to  be  based  on  one  or  more 
convenient  simplifications,  such  as  log linearity or perfect product homogeneity, 
                                                                                                                                    
experimenter can approximately duplicate a test environment in a subsequent trial. 
     
18  The Washington Post (July 5, 1990, p. D1) summarized this consensus:  “In studying government 
data,  everyone  from  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences  to  the  National  Association  of  Business 
Economists has reached the same conclusion ─ there are serious problems regarding the accuracy and 
usefulness of the statistics.” 16                                                                                                               CHAPTER 1 
 
which are violated in nonlaboratory markets, often to an unknown extent.
19  Demand 
is even more difficult to observe, since there is nothing analogous to cost data for 
consumers. 
  Although econometric methods may be used to estimate market supply and 
demand curves from transactions-price data, this estimation process typically rests on 
an assumption that prices are constantly near the equilibrium.  (Then shifts in supply, 
holding  demand  constant,  may  be  used  to  identify  demand,  and  conversely  for 
supply estimates.)  Alternatively it is possible to estimate supply and demand without 
assuming that the market is in equilibrium, but in this case it is necessary to make 
specific assumptions about the nature of the disequilibrium.  In either case, it is a 
questionable  exercise  to  attempt  to  evaluate  equilibrium  tendencies  in  a  market 
where supply and demand are estimated on the basis of specific assumptions about 
whether or how markets equilibrate. 
  Thus, tests of market propositions with natural data are joint tests of a rather 
complicated set of primary and auxiliary hypotheses.  Unless auxiliary hypotheses 
are valid, tests of primary hypotheses provide little indisputable information.  On the 
one hand, negative results do not allow rejection of a theory.  Evidence that seems to 
contradict  the  implications  of  a  theory  may  arise  when  the  theory  is  true,  if  a 
subsidiary hypothesis is false.  On the other hand, even very supportive results may 
be  misleading  because  a  test  may  generate  the “right” result, but for the wrong 
reason;  the  primary  hypotheses  may  have  no  explanatory  power,  yet  subsidiary 
hypotheses may be sufficiently incorrect to generate apparently supportive data. 
  Laboratory  methods  allow  a  dramatic reduction in the number of auxiliary 
hypotheses involved in examining a primary hypothesis.  For example, using the cost 
and value inducement procedure introduced by Chamberlin and Smith, a test of the 
capacity of a market to generate competitive price and quantity predictions can be 
conducted  without  assumptions about functional forms and product homogeneity 
that are typically needed to estimate competitive price predictions in a naturally 
occurring market.  By inducing a controlled environment that is fully understood by 
the  investigator, laboratory methods can be used to provide a minimal test of a 
theory.  If the theory does not work under the controlled “best-shot” conditions of 
the  laboratory,  the  obvious  question  is  whether  it  will  work  well  under  any 
circumstances.  
  Even  given  the  shortcomings  of  nonexperimental  data,  critics  are  often 
skeptical  about  the  value  of  laboratory  methods  in  economics.  Some  immediate 
sources of skepticism are far less critical than they first appear. For example, one 
natural  reservation  is  that  relevant  decision  makers  in  the  economy  are  more 
                                                 
     
19  Anyone who is familiar with predatory pricing cases, for example, knows the difficulties of 
measuring a concept as simple as average variable cost.  Moreover, tests for predatory pricing (such as the 
Areeda/Turner test) are operationalized in average-cost rather than in more theoretically precise marginal-
cost terms, because marginal-cost measures are too elusive. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW                                                                               17 
 
sophisticated  than  undergraduates  or  MBA  students  who  comprise  most  subject 
pools.  This critique is more relevant for some types of experiments (e.g., studies of 
trading  in  futures  markets)  than  for  others  (e.g.,  studies  of  consumer  shopping 
behavior), but in any event, it is an argument about the choice of subjects rather than 
about the usefulness of experimentation.  If the economic agents in relevant markets 
think differently from undergraduates, then the selection of subjects should reflect 
this.  Notably, the behavior of decision makers recruited from naturally occurring 
markets has been examined in a variety of contexts, for example, Dyer, Kagel, and 
Levin (1989), Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Mestelman and Feeny (1988), 
and  DeJong  et.  al  (1988).    Behavior  of  these  decision makers has typically not 
differed from that exhibited by more standard (and far less costly) student subject 
pools.  For example, Smith, Suchanek, Williams (1988) observed price “bubbles” 
and “crashes” in laboratory asset markets, with both student subjects and business 
and professional people.
20 
  A second immediate reservation concerning the use of experiments is that the 
markets  of  primary  interest  to  economists  are  complicated,  while  laboratory 
environments are often relatively simple.  This objection, however, is as much a 
criticism of the theories as of the experiments.  Granted, performance of a theory in a 
simple laboratory setting may not carry over to a more complex natural setting.  If 
this is the case, and if the experiment is structured in a manner that is consistent with 
the relevant economic theory, then perhaps the theory has omitted some potentially 
important feature of the economy.  On the other hand, if the theory fails to work in a 
simple  experiment,  then  there  is  little  reason  to  expect  it  to  work  in  a  more 
complicated natural world.
21   
  It is imperative to add that experimentation is no panacea.  Important issues in 
experimental design, administration, and interpretation bear continued scrutiny.  For 
instance, although concerns regarding subject pool and environmental simplicity are 
not  grounds  for  dismissing  experimental  methods  out  of  hand,  these  issues  do 
present  prominent  concerns.    While  available  evidence  suggests  that  the  use  of 
relevant professionals does not invariably affect performance, a number of studies do 
indicate that performance can vary with proxies for the aptitude of participants, such 
as  the  undergraduate  institution  (e.g.,  Davis  and  Holt,  1991)  or  using  graduate 
instead of undergraduate students.
22  For this reason, choosing a specific participant 
pool may be appropriate in some instances.   
                                                 
     
20  In some instances the use of “relevant professionals” impedes laboratory performance.  Dyer, 
Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Burns (1985) find that relevant professionals involved in laboratory markets 
sometimes attempt to apply rules of thumb, which, while valuable for dealing with uncertainty in the 
parallel  natural  market,  are  meaningless  guides  in  the  laboratory.    DeJong  et  al.  (1988)  report  that 
businessmen need more instruction on the use of a computer keyboard.   
     
21  This defense is well articulated by Plott (1982, 1989). 
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  Similarly, the relative simplicity of laboratory markets can be an important 
drawback if one's purpose is to make claims regarding the performance of natural 
markets.  Economists in general are well acquainted with the pressures to “oversell” 
research  results  in  an  effort  to  attract  funds  from  agencies  interested  in  policy-
relevant  research.    Experimental  investigators  are  by  no  means  immune  to  such 
temptations.  It is all too easy, for instance, to give an investigation of a game-
theoretic equilibrium concept the appearance of policy relevance by attaching catchy 
labels to the alternative decisions, and then interpreting the results in a broad policy 
context.  But realistically, no variant of a prisoner's-dilemma experiment will provide 
much new information about industrial policy, regardless of how the decisions are 
labeled. 
  Technical  difficulties  in  establishing  and  controlling  the  laboratory 
environment also present important impediments to effective experimentation.  This 
is particularly true when the purpose of the experiment is to elicit information about 
individual preferences (as opposed to evaluating the outcomes of group interactions 
given a set of induced preferences).  The effectiveness of many macroeconomic 
policies, for example, depends on the recognition of intertemporal tradeoffs.  Do 
people anticipate that tax cuts today will necessitate increases later, perhaps decades 
later?  Do agents care about what happens to future generations?  Do agents have a 
bequest motive?  Although these are clearly behavioral questions, they may be very 
difficult to address in the laboratory.  Most people may only consider questions 
regarding bequests seriously in their later years, and responses regarding intended 
behavior at other times may be poor predictors.  Although elaborate schemes have 
been  devised  to  address  elicitation  issues,  it  is  probably  fair  to  say  that 
experimentalists have been much less successful with the elicitation of preferences 
than with their inducement. In addition, there are some ongoing questions about 
whether it is technically possible to induce critical components of some economic 
environments  in  the  laboratory,  for  example,  infinite  horizons  or  risk  aversion.  
Some very clever approaches to these problems will be discussed in later chapters.  
  Overall,  the  advantages  of  experimentation  are  decisive.    Experimental 
methods, however, complement rather than substitute for other empirical techniques. 
 Moreover,  in  some  contexts  we  can  hope  to  learn  relatively  little  from 
experimentation.  It is important to keep the initial infatuation with the novelty of the 
technique from leading to the mindless application of experimental methods to every 




1.5 Types of Experiments 
 
  The “stick” of replicability forces those who conduct experiments to consider 
in detail the appropriate procedures for designing and administering experiments,  as 
well as standards for evaluating them.  Laboratory investigations can have a variety INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW                                                                               19 
 
of aims, however, and appropriate procedures depend on the kind of experiment 
being  conducted.    For  this  reason  it  is  instructive  to  discuss  several  alternative 
objectives of experimentation: tests of behavioral hypotheses, sensitivity tests, and 
documentation of empirical regularities.  This discussion is introductory.  Chapter 9 
contains  a  more  thorough  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  economic 
experiments and tests of economic propositions. 
 
Tests of Behavioral Hypotheses 
 
  Perhaps the most common use of experimental methods in economics is theory 
falsification.  By constructing a laboratory environment that satisfies as many of the 
structural assumptions of a particular theory as possible, its behavioral implications 
can be given a best chance.  Poor predictive power under such circumstances is 
particularly troubling for the theory's proponents. 
    It  is  rarely  a  trivial  task  to  construct  idealized  environments,  that  is, 
environments  consistent  with  the  structural  assumptions  of  the  relevant  model.  
Indeed, this task is not likely to be accomplished in one iteration of experimentation. 
 Despite the glamour of the much heralded “critical experiment,” such breakthroughs 
are  rare.    Rather,  the  process  of  empirical  evaluation  more  often  involves  a 
continuing  interaction  between  theorist  and  experimenter,  and  often  addresses 
elements initially ignored in theory.  For example, Chamberlin's demonstration that 
markets fail to generate competitive outcomes led Smith to consider the effects of 
trading  rules  on  market  performance,  and  ultimately  led  to  the  extensive 
consideration of important institutional factors that had been typically ignored by 
theorists.  In this way, experiments foster development of a dialogue between the 
theorist and the empiricist, a dialogue that forces the theorist to specify models in 
terms of observable variables, and forces the data collector to be precise and clever 
in obtaining the desired control. 
 
Theory Stress Tests 
 
  If the key behavioral assumptions of a theory are not rejected in a minimal 
laboratory environment, the logical next step is to begin bridging the gap between 
laboratory and naturally occurring markets.  One approach to this problem involves 
examining  the  sensitivity  of  a  theory  to  violations  of  “obviously  unrealistic” 
simplifying assumptions.  For example, even if theories of perfect competition and 
perfect contestability organize behavior in simple laboratory implementations, these 
theories would be of limited practical value if they were unable to accommodate 
finite numbers of agents or small, positive entry costs.  By examining laboratory 
markets  with  progressively  fewer  sellers,  or  with  positive  (and  increasing)  entry 
costs, the robustness of each theory to its simplifying assumptions can be evaluated.  20                                                                                                               CHAPTER 1 
 
Systematic  stress-testing  a  theory  in  this  manner  is  usually  not possible with an 
analysis of nonexperimental data.
23 
  Another  immediate application of a theory stress test involves information.  
Most game theories postulate complete information, or incomplete information in a 
carefully limited dimension.  But in some applications (e.g., industrial organization) 
game theory is being used too simplistically if the accuracy of its predictions is 
sensitive to small amounts of uncertainty about parameters of the market structure.  
There  is  some  evidence  that  this  is  not  the  case,  that  is,  that  the  concept  of  a 
noncooperative  (Nash)  equilibrium  sometimes  has  more  predictive  power  when 
subjects  are  given  no  information  about  others'  payoff  functions  (Fouraker  and 
Siegel, 1963, and Dolbear et al., 1968).  This is because subjects do not have to 
calculate the noncooperative equilibrium strategies in the way that a theorist would; 
all  they  have  to  do  is  respond  optimally  to  the  empirical  distribution  of  others' 
decisions observed in previous plays of the game.     
 
Searching for Empirical Regularities 
        
  A  particularly  valuable  type  of  empirical  research  is  the  documentation  of 
surprising regularities in relationships between observed economic variables.  For 
example, the negative effect of cumulative production experience on unit costs has 
led to a large literature on “learning curves.”  Roth (1986) notes that experimentation 
can also be used to discover and document such “stylized facts.”  This search is 
facilitated in laboratory markets in which there is little or no measurement error and 
in  which  the  basic  underlying  demand,  supply,  and  informational  conditions  are 
known  by  the  experimenter.    It  would  be  difficult  to  conclude  that  prices  in  a 
particular industry are above competitive levels, for example, if marginal costs or 
secret discounts cannot be measured very well, as is usually the case.  Anyone who 
has  followed  an  empirical  debate  in  the  economics  literature  (for  example,  the 
concentration-profits  debate  in  industrial  organization)  can  appreciate  the 
attractiveness of learning  something from market experiments, even if the issues 




1.6 Some Procedural and Design Considerations 
 
  The diversity of research objectives and designs complicates identification of a 
single set of acceptable laboratory procedures.  Consequently, both desirable and 
undesirable procedures will be discussed in various portions of the text, and specific 
examples and applications will be given in the chapter appendices.  However, there 
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are some general design and procedural considerations common to most laboratory 
investigations, and it is instructive to review them at this time.  For clarity, this 
discussion will be presented primarily in terms of market experiments.  
  In general, the experimental design should enable the researcher to utilize the 
main  advantages of experimentation that were discussed above: replicability and 
control.  Although a classification of design considerations is, to some extent, a 
matter of taste, we find the following categories to be useful: procedural regularity, 
motivation, unbiasedness, calibration, and design parallelism.  Procedural regularity 
involves following a routine that can be replicated.  Motivation, unbiasedness, and 
calibration are important features of control that will be explained below.  Design 
parallelism  pertains  to  links  between  an  experimental  setting  and  a  naturally 
occurring economic process.  These design criteria will be discussed in a general 
manner  here;  specific  practical  implications  of  some  of  these  criteria  are 
incorporated into a detailed list of suggestions for conducting a market experiment in 
appendix A1.2.  
  Prior  to  proceeding,  it  is  convenient  to  introduce  some  terminology.    No 
standard  conventions  have  yet  arisen  for  referring  to  the  components  of  an 
experiment, so for purposes of clarity we will adopt the following terminology: 
 
  session:     a  sequence  of  periods,  games,  or  other decision tasks 
involving the same group of subjects on the same day 
  cohort:    a group of subjects that participated in a session 
  treatment:    a  unique  environment  or  configuration  of  treatment 
variables, i.e., of information, experience, incentives, and 
rules   
  cell:      a set of sessions with the same experimental treatment 
conditions 
  experiment design:  a  specification  of  sessions  in  one  or  more  cells  to 
evaluate the propositions of interest  
  experiment:    the collection of sessions in one or more related cells 
 
 
The reader should be warned that some of these terms are often used differently in 
the literature.  In particular, it is common to use the word “experiment” to indicate 
what we will call a “session.”  Our definition follows Roth (1990), who argues that 
the  interaction  of  a  group  of  subjects  in  a  single  meeting  should  be  called  a 
“session,” and that the word “experiment” should be reserved for a collection of 
sessions designed to evaluate one or more related economic propositions.  By this 
definition an experiment is usually, but not always, the evidence reported in a single 
paper.
24     
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  Finally,  most  experimental  sessions  involve  repeated  decisions,  and  some 
terms  are  needed  to  identify  separate  decision  units.    Appropriate  terminology 
depends on the type of experiment:  A decision unit will be referred to as a trial, 
when discussing individual decision-making experiments, as a game when discussing 




  The professional credibility that an experimenter places on data collected is 
critical to the usefulness of experiments.  It is imperative that others can and do 
replicate laboratory results, and that the researcher feel the pressure of potential 
replication when conducting and reporting results.  To facilitate replication, it is 
important  that  the  procedures  and  environment  be  standardized  so  that  only  the 
treatment variables are adjusted.  Moreover, it is important that these procedures 
(and  particularly  instructions)  be carefully documented.   In general, the guiding 
principle for standardizing and reporting procedures is to permit a replication that 
the researcher and outside observers would accept as being valid.  The researcher 
should adopt and report standard practices pertaining to the following:
25 
   
    instructions 
    illustrative examples and tests of understanding (which should be included    
      in the instructions) 
    criteria for answering questions (e.g., no information beyond instructions) 
    the nature of monetary or other rewards  
    the presence of “trial” or practice periods with no rewards 
    the subject pool and the method of recruiting subjects  
    the number and experience levels of subjects  
    procedures for matching subjects and roles 
    the location, approximate dates, and duration of experimental sessions 
    the physical environment, the use of laboratory assistants, special devices,  
    and computerization  
    any intentional deception of subjects  
    procedural irregularities in specific sessions that require interpretation   
 
Even if journal space requirements preclude the publication of instructions, work 
sheets, and data, the researcher should make this information available to journal 
referees and others who may wish to review and evaluate the research. 
   
 
                                                 
     
25  This  list  approximately  corresponds  to  Palfrey  and  Porter's  (1991)  list  in  “Guidelines  for 
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  The use of computers has done much to strengthen standards of replicability in 
economics.
26  The presentation of the instructions and the experimental environment 
via visually isolated computer terminals increases standardization and control within 
an experiment and decreases the effort involved in replication with different groups 
of subjects.  Moreover, some procedural tasks that involve a lot of interaction or 
privacy  are  much  easier  to  implement  via  computer,  and  computerization  often 
enables the researcher to obtain more observations within a session by economizing 
on the time devoted to record keeping and message delivery.
27 
  Importantly,  however,  computers  are  not  necessary  to  conduct  most 
experiments.    Even  with  extensive  access  to  computers,  some  noncomputerized 
procedures retain their usefulness.  The physical act of throwing dice, for example, 
may more convincingly generate random numbers than computer routines if subjects 
suspect  deception  or  if  payoffs  are  unusually  large.    Similarly,  even  when 
instructions are presented via computer, we generally prefer to have an experimenter 
read  instructions  aloud  as  the  subjects  follow  on  their  screens.    This  increases 
common  knowledge,  that  is,  everyone  knows  that  everyone  else  knows  certain 
aspects of the procedures and payoffs.  Reading along also prevents some subjects 
from finishing ahead of others and becoming bored.   
  A final issue in procedural matters regards the creation and maintenance of a 
subject pool.  Although rarely discussed, the manner in which subjects are recruited, 
instructed, and paid can importantly affect outcomes.  Behavior in the laboratory 
may be colored by contacts the students have with each other outside the laboratory; 
for example, in experiments involving deception or cooperation, friends may behave 
differently from anonymous participants.  Problems of this type may be particularly 
pronounced in some professional schools and European university systems, where all 
students in the same year take the same courses.  Potential problems may be avoided 
by recruiting participants for a given session from multiple classes (years).  For 
similar reasons, an experimenter may wish to avoid being present in sessions that 
involve  subjects  who  are  currently  enrolled in one of his or her courses.  Such 
students may alter their choices in light of what they think their professor wants to 
see.  
   The researcher should also be careful to avoid deceiving participants.  Most 
economists  are  very  concerned  about  developing  and  maintaining  a  reputation 
among the student population for honesty in order to ensure that subject actions are 
                                                 
     
26  At present there are some two dozen computerized economics laboratories in the United States, as 
well as several in Europe. 
     
27  The effects of computerization in the context of the double auction are discussed in chapter 3, 
section 3.3.  Also, one of the advantages of computerization lies in the way instructions can be presented. 
 Instructions for a computerized implementation of a posted-offer auction are presented in appendix 4.2 to 
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motivated by the induced monetary rewards rather than by psychological reactions to 
suspected manipulation.  Subjects may suspect deception if it is present.  Moreover, 
even if subjects fail to detect deception within a session, it may jeopardize future 
experiments if the subjects ever find out that they were deceived and report this 
information to their friends.
28  Another important aspect of maintaining a subject 
pool is the development of a system for recording subjects' history of participation.  
This  is  particularly  important  at  universities  where  experiments  are  done  by  a 
number of different researchers.  A common record of names and participation dates 
allows  each  experimenter  to  be  more  certain  that  a  new  subject  is  really 
inexperienced  with  the  institution  being  used.    Similarly,  in  sessions  where 
experience is desired, a good record-keeping system makes it possible to control the 




   In  designing  an  experiment,  it  is  critical  that  participants  receive  salient 
rewards  that  correspond  to  the  incentives  assumed  in  the  relevant  theory  or 
application.    Saliency  simply  means  that changes in decisions have a prominent 
effect on rewards.  Saliency requires (1) that the subjects perceive the relationship 
between decisions made and payoff outcomes, and (2) that the induced rewards are 
high enough to matter in the sense that they dominate subjective costs of making 
decisions and trades.  For example, consider a competitive quantity prediction that 
requires the trade of a unit worth $1.40 to a buyer, but which costs a seller $1.30.  
This trade will not be completed, and the competitive quantity prediction will “fail,” 
if the joint costs of negotiating the contract exceed $.10. 
  One  can  never  be  assured,  a  priori,  that  rewards  are  adequate  without 
considering the context of a particular experiment.  On the one hand, participants 
will try to “do well” in many instances by maximizing even purely hypothetical 
payment  amounts.    On  the  other  hand,  inconsistent  or  variable  behavior  is  not 
necessarily a signal of insufficient monetary incentives.  No amount of money can 
motivate subjects to perform a calculation beyond their intellectual capacities, any 
more than generous bonuses would transform most of us into professional athletes.
29 
 It has been fairly well established, however, that providing payments to subjects 
                                                 
     
28  Many economists believe that deception is highly undesirable in economics experiments, and for 
this reason, they argue that the results of experiments using deceptive procedures should not be published. 
 Deceptive  procedures  are  more  common  and  perhaps  less  objectionable  in  other  disciplines  (e.g., 
psychology). 
     
29  Vernon Smith made a similar point in a different context in an oral presentation at the Economic 
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tends to reduce performance variability.
30  For this reason, economics experiments 
almost always involve nonhypothetical payments. 
  Also, as a general matter, rewards are monetary.  Monetary payoffs minimize 
concerns  regarding  the  effects  of  heterogeneous  individual  attitudes  toward  the 
reward medium.  Denominating rewards in terms of physical commodities such as 
coffee cups or chocolate bars may come at the cost of some loss in control, since 
participants  may  privately  value  the  physical  commodities  very  differently.  
Monetary payoffs are also highly divisible and have the advantage of nonsatiation; it 
is somewhat less problematic to assume that participants do not become “full” of 
money than, say, chocolate bars. 
  In many contexts, inducing a sufficient motivation for marginal actions will 
require a substantial variation in earnings across participants, even if all participants 
make careful decisions.  High-cost sellers in a market, for example, will tend to earn 
less than low-cost sellers, regardless of their decisions.  If possible, average rewards 
should be set high enough to offset the opportunity cost of time for all participants.  
This  opportunity  cost  will  depend  on  the  subject  pool;  it  will  be  higher  for 
professionals than for student subjects.  If there are several alternative theories or 
hypotheses  being  considered,  then  the  earnings  levels  should  be  adequate  for 
motivational purposes at each of the alternative outcomes under consideration.  For 
example, if sellers' earnings are zero at a competitive equilibrium, then competitive 
pricing  behavior  may  not be observed, since zero earnings may result in erratic 
behavior. 
  In  some  experiments,  subjects'  earnings  are  denominated  in  a  laboratory 
currency, for example, tokens or francs, and later converted into cash.  A very low 
conversion rate (e.g., 100 laboratory “francs” per penny earned) can create a fine 
price grid to more nearly approximate theoretical results of continuous models.  A 
coarse  price  grid  in  oligopoly  games,  for  example,  can  introduce  a  number  of 
additional,  unwelcome  equilibria.    A  second  advantage  of  using  a  laboratory 
currency  “filter”  arises  in  situations  where  the  experimenter  wishes  to  minimize 
interpersonal payoff comparisons by giving subjects different conversion ratios that 
are  private  information.    Procedures  of  this  sort  have  been  used  in  bargaining 
experiments.  A laboratory currency may also be used to control the location of focal 
payoff points when payoff levels are of some concern.  The effects of earnings levels 
on  the  absolute  payoff  level  could  be  controlled,  for  example,  by  conducting 
treatments in the same design, but under different franc/dollar conversion rates.  The 
                                                 
     
30  In  the  absence  of  financial  incentives,  it  is  more  common  to  observe  occasional  large  and 
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yields  better  predictions  when  sufficient  financial  motivation  is  provided.    For  example,  Siegel  and 
Goldstein (1959) showed that an increase in the reward level resulted in an increase in the proportion of 
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denomination of payoffs in lab dollars could also control for differences in focal 
points in sessions conducted in different countries with different currencies. 
  Some  experimentalists  further  maintain  that  a  currency  filter  can  increase 
incentives; for example, subjects may make an effort to earn 100 francs, even if they 
would scoff at the monetary equivalent of, say, one penny.  We find this money-
illusion argument less persuasive.  Many tourists in a foreign country for the first 
time return with stories about spending thousands of pesos, or whatever, and not 
worrying about the real cost of goods.  It is possible that the use of a laboratory 
currency could similarly mask or even dilute financial incentives.  Moreover, even if 
laboratory payoffs do create a monetary illusion, they could also create an artificial 
“game-board” sense of speculative competitiveness.  For these reasons, it is probably 
prudent  to  denominate  laboratory  earnings  in  cash,  unless  the  researcher  has  a 
specific design motivation for using a laboratory currency.  
  Three additional comments regarding motivation bear brief mention.  First, it is 
a fairly standard practice to pay participants an appearance fee in addition to their 
earnings in the course of the experiment.  Payment of a preannounced fee facilitates 
recruiting of subjects, establishes credibility, and perhaps provides some incentive 
for participants to pay attention to instructions.  Second, it is usually important for 
the experimenter to be specific about all aspects of the experiment in order to control 
the motivation.  For example, the failure to provide information about the duration or 
number of periods in a session may affect subjects' perceptions of the incentives to 
collude in an unknown and uncontrolled manner.  The third point is a qualification of 
the second.  There is a risk of losing control over incentives if subjects are given 
complete  information  about  others'  money  payoffs.    With  complete  information, 
envy and benevolence are more likely, which is a problem if the theoretical model 
stipulates that agents maximize their own payoffs.  Smith (1982) includes privacy 
(only knowing one's own payoff function) in a list of sufficient conditions for a valid 
microeconomics experiment.  Privacy is appropriate for some purposes, such as tests 
of theories that specify privacy or stress tests of those that do not.  On the other hand, 
privacy  may  not  be  appropriate  for  experiments  motivated  by  a  game-theoretic 






  Experiments should be conducted in a manner that does not lead participants to 
perceive  any  particular  behavioral  pattern  as  being  correct  or  expected,  unless 
explicit suggestion is a treatment variable.  The possibility of replication should 
provide incentives sufficient to deter egregious attempts at distorting  participant 
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behavior.  We mention the issue of biasedness, however, not to warn researchers 
away from patently suggestive behavior, but rather to note how careful even the most 
well-intentioned researcher must be to avoid subtle behavioral suggestions.  Unlike 
other observational laboratory data (say atomic particles), human participants can be 
eager  to  do  what  the  researcher  desires  and  can  respond  to  surprisingly  subtle 
indications that they are doing “well.”  If an experiment is conducted by hand, it is 
sometimes useful to have the experiment administrator be unaware of the theoretical 
predictions in a particular design.  In a laboratory market session, for example, this 
can be done by adding a parameter-disguising constant to all values and costs, which 
shifts  supply  and  demand  vertically  by  the  same  distance,  without  changing  the 
essential structure of the market.  Altering the shift parameter with each session 
makes it possible for an experiment monitor to be unaware of the equilibrium price.  
These alterations also reduce the chance that ex post discussions among students will 
affect behavior in subsequent sessions. 
  Some researchers believe that sessions should be conducted by assistants who 
do not know the purpose of the experiment, that is, in a “double-blind” setting.  Our 
own feeling is that the researcher has the strongest incentive and ability to spot 
procedural problems, and therefore we prefer to be present during a session.  But 
subjects in some types of experiments, especially those involving fairness issues, 
may be influenced by the fact that they are being observed by third parties.  In such 
situations, it may be best for the researcher to be unobtrusive or unobserved. 
  Another  possible  source  of  bias  is  the  terminology  used  to  explain  the 
incentives.  The trade of abstract commodities, as opposed to “pollution permits” or 
“failing  firms,”  may  prevent  unobserved  personal  preferences  or  aversions  for 
particular goods from influencing results.  Certain economic or market terms may 
also suggest particular types of behavior, for example, “cartel” or “conspiracy.”  For 
these reasons, it is usually considered a good practice to avoid references to any 
particular good.  There is, however, a tradeoff to be made here.  Although simple 
tests  of  game-theoretic  concepts  can  and  should  be  conducted  without  giving 
economic names to the decision variables, the use of market terminology in other, 
more  complicated  trading  institutions  is  valuable  in  communicating  the  payoff 
structure effectively.  For example, although is possible to conduct one of Smith's 
double-auction  market  experiments  without  ever  using  words  such  as  “buyer,” 
“seller,” or “price,” it would be very difficult to explain the structure to the subjects.  
(If you are not convinced, try it!  Revise the double-auction instructions in appendix 
A1.1 so that they are entirely neutral with respect to market terminology.)   
  One should use common sense in evaluating the tradeoff between providing 
enough of an economic context to explain the incentive structure and not providing 
suggestive  terminology.    It  is  worthwhile  to  spend  a  lot  of  time  working  on 
instructions; the safest procedure is to begin with standard, often-used instructions, 
and to modify them for the purpose at hand.   Pilot experiments and individual   
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example, one of the authors once had a subject tell him that the word “oligopoly” on 
a  receipt  form  “gave  away”  the  purpose  of  the  experiment,  since  the  subject 
remembered from his introductory economics class that oligopolists are supposed to 
collude.    This  subject  was  unusually  successful  at  colluding.    As  a  result,  all 




  Experiments  also  need  to  be  designed  with  an  eye  to  the  generated  data.  
Calibration involves the establishment of a clear basis of comparison.  Suppose, for 
example,  that  the  hypothesis  being  investigated  is  that  competitive  behavior  is 
altered by a treatment, say, the consolidation of market power in the hands of a few 
sellers.  In this case, it is desirable to begin with a “baseline” condition in which 
competitive outcomes are generated in the absence of market power.  A related 
aspect of calibration is the use of a design in which the predictions of alternative 
theories  are  cleanly  separated.    This  aspect  is  important  because  the  process  of 
evaluating a behavioral theory comes through falsification rather than validation, and 
falsification  is  more  convincing  if  there  is  a  reasonable  alternative  that  is  not 
falsified. 
  To make this discussion concrete, consider an evaluation of data that could be 
generated with the experimental market design in figure 1.2.  Suppose that nine 
independent sessions (with different cohorts of subjects) have been conducted, each 
lasting  for  the  same  number  of  trading  periods.    Suppose  further  that  we  are 
concerned  about  evaluating  the  tendency  for  this  market  to  generate  predicted 
competitive prices (between $1.30 and $1.40).  One way to analyze the results would 
be to take a single price measure from each session, such as the average final-period 
price.  Admittedly, such a procedure discards much of the relevant data, but its 
simplicity makes it a useful expositional device.  Also, the consequent observations 
have the advantage of statistical independence, since each session is done with a 
different group of subjects.
32 
    Consider now some possible mean-price outcomes.  Suppose first that prices 
deviated rather substantially and uniformly from the competitive prediction.  For 
example, assume that the average of the nine price observations is $1.60, with a 
standard deviation (of the final-period mean prices) of $0.20.  In this case, the null 
hypothesis of the competitive price prediction could be rejected at normal levels of  
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significance.
33  Now  consider  what  happens  when  prices  are  closer  to  the 
competitive prediction.  For example, suppose the mean of the nine observations was 
$1.45, with the same $.20 standard deviation.  The null hypothesis of the competitive 
prediction could no longer be rejected at any conventional level of significance.
34  
But neither could it be accepted.  In fact, we would be unable to make an affirmative 
statistical claim about the competitive prediction even if the mean price was closer to 
the  competitive  range.    Rather,  affirmative  claims  are  limited  to  nonquantitative 
observations that prices “appear” to conform to the competitive prediction.  This is 
the process (and problem) of falsification; we can sometimes determine when data 
do not support a theory, but it is far more difficult to conclude that evidence actually 
supports a theory. 
  We avoid the philosophical issue of what is ultimately necessary for empirical 
verification of a theory.  However, more convincing claims can be made if the data 
allow falsification of rival theories.  For example, consider what could be said if the 
mean of the nine price observations was $1.35, with a $.20 standard deviation, in 
light of the monopoly or monopsony predictions listed in table 1.2.  Although these 
observations  cannot  directly  allow  acceptance  of  the  hypothesis  that  prices  are 
competitive, the competitive-price hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the alternative 
hypotheses that prices are at the collusive level for either buyers or sellers can be 
rejected at standard significance levels.  This is the issue of calibration.  Theories are 
much more meaningfully evaluated in light of alternatives.  Rejection of reasonable 
alternatives strengthens a failure to reject the maintained hypothesis.  Conversely, a 
theory that organizes some aspects of the data well should not be discarded until a 
better alternative is found. 
  Behavioral “noise” is inevitable.  For example, although prices clustered about 
the competitive prediction in the two periods of the market session discussed in 
section 1.3, they were not uniformly confined within the bounds of the competitive 
price  range.    In  fact,  it  is  quite  reasonable  to  suspect  that  some  residual  price 
variability would remain, even after a relatively large number of trading periods with 
the same traders.  In light of this behavioral noise, two points need to be made.  The 
first  is  a  design  issue.    Careful  experimental  design  requires  more  than  merely 
identifying alternative predictions.  The behavioral consequences of rival predictions 
should  further  be  sufficiently  distinct  to  be  readily  differentiated  from  inherent 
performance variability.  For example, an alteration in the figure 1.2 design that 
made the demand curve much more elastic would make the behavioral distinction 
between cooperative and competitive behavior much more difficult, since the price 
consequences of these two alternatives would be much closer.  
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different from the competitive prediction would be 3, or [$1.60 – $1.40] / [.20 /  9].  Nonparametric tests 
are discussed in chapter 9. 
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  The second issue has to do with anticipated performance variability that is 
outside the domain of the theory.  Although some behavioral variability is effectively 
irreducible noise, there exist other theoretically irrelevant factors that quite regularly 
affect performance, such as experience with the experimental environment, group 
effects,  and  the  order  in  which  treatments  are  presented.    To  draw  legitimate 
statistical claims, it is important to control for these anticipated sources of variability. 
  Blocking, or systematic pairing of observations, may be used to neutralize the 
effects  of  such nuisance variables.  Consider, for example, a market experiment 
designed to evaluate the effects of communication among sellers on pricing.  The 
experiment contains two treatments: A (no-communication) and B (communication). 
If it turns out that communication tends to produce higher, collusive prices, it would 
also not be surprising to observe a sequencing, or order-of-treatment, effect.  In a 
given session, we might expect to see higher prices in no-communication treatment 
A when it follows communication treatment B than when it precedes B.  Sometimes 
the economics of the problem suggests a particular sequence.  For example, it is 
often reasonable for a status quo treatment to precede a treatment that implements a 
possible alternative policy.  When the economics of the situation does not require a 
particular sequence, it may be advisable to reverse the order of the treatments in 
every other session to control for sequence effects.  
  Another way to avoid sequence effects would be to have only one treatment 
per session, but this necessitates a large number of sessions if there is considerable 
variability from one group of subjects to another.  To clarify this point, suppose that 
six sessions using the A and B treatments are conducted, and that the sequence is 
alternated in every other session.  Sessions in figure 1.3 are denoted as separate 
rows. In each row, the average price for each treatment is denoted with an A or a B, 
along a horizontal scale where prices increase with rightward movements.  There is a 
clear treatment effect; in each session, price is higher for treatment B.  But group 
effects are such that there is very little correlation between treatment and average 
price in the aggregate.  Very little could have been concluded if the data in figure 1.3 
had been generated from twelve independent sessions; both A and B observations 
tend to cluster about the vertical bar printed in the center of the graph. (Look in 
particular at the bottom row.)  But consideration of the data in figure 1.3 as paired 
treatments allows one to reject the hypothesis of no treatment effect with a very high 
degree  of  confidence,  with  at  least  the  same  confidence  that  one  can  reject  the 
hypothesis that a coin is fair after observing six heads in a row.  In this context, 
blocking allows one to control for sequence and subject-group effects at the same 
time.
35   The example in figure 1.3 also illustrates the notion that the structure of the 
experimental  design  (treatment  cells,  blocking,  and  numbers  of  trails)  should          
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available with each treatment is reduced.  This can be a problem if adjustment to equilibrium is slow or 
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be  planned  with  a  consideration  for  the  subsequent  statistical  analysis  of  the 
hypotheses of interest.  This is rarely done by experimental economists, as noted by 
Hinkelmann (1990).  
 
 
   
Sometimes the number of things that can be systematically blocked is unreasonably 
large and the alternative configurations can be selected randomly, in a randomized 
block.  For example, in an experiment with three buyers and one seller, there are 
twenty-four ways in which the order of subject arrival times can be related to the 
four role assignments.  It would not be advisable to let the first person to arrive 
always have the monopoly role, since early arrival may be correlated with some 
unobserved characteristic of importance.  A complete block would require twenty-
four sessions, and a random assignment method is a simpler way to avoid systematic 
biases.
36   
 
Design Parallelism  
 
  As a final design issue, we consider the extent to which experiments should be 
constructed to resemble naturally occurring economic situations.  The term design 
parallelism  is  used  here  to  indicate  closeness  to  natural  situations  rather  than 
                                                 
     
36  We will say more about the relationship between experimental design and statistical analysis of 
data in chapter 9. 
Session  Lower Prices                  Higher Prices 
1       A  B             
2                 A    B   
3  A    B               
4        AB             
5          A  B         
6              A   B       
1-6  A    BA  BAB   A  B  A  AB    B   
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closeness  to  the  theories  that  economists  have  devised.
37  Given  the  relative 
simplicity of laboratory environments, nonexperimentalists tend to be skeptical, and 
experimentalists should be cautious of claims about behavior in natural markets.  
Nevertheless,  as  a  general  matter,  the  experimenter  should  strive for parsimony.  
Recall that theory falsification is a prominent goal of experimental analysis.  Such 
tests require specification of a laboratory environment that satisfies the conditions of 
the  theory,  rather  than  the  conditions  of  a  natural  market.    Increasing  design 
parallelism by adding complexity to an experiment is seductively easy, but it often 
results in situations that are difficult to analyze in theory and difficult for subjects to 
comprehend quickly.   
  The process of theory falsification in an idealized environment is not devoid of 
policy relevance.  Although simple experiments will not predict the effects of a 
particular theory or policy remedy in richer environments, such experiments can 
provide a reasonable amount of evidence about whether policy proposals will have 
desired effects.  For example, Isaac and Smith (1985) conducted a series of sessions 
with a proposed antipredation rule that prohibits a temporary price reduction by a 
dominant firm in response to entry; these sessions exhibited higher prices and lower 
efficiencies than were observed in comparable “unprotected” markets, conducted 
without the rule.  These results make the regulatory “cure” highly suspect, for it 
harms performance even under the best of circumstances. 
In general, if the behavioral assumptions of a theory fail under simple conditions, the 
burden of explanation should be shifted to the advocates of the related policy. 
  Maximum parsimony is not always desirable, however.  Adding complexity is 
justifiable when attempting to make positive claims about a theory as part of the 
stress-testing  process.    The  likelihood  that  a  theory  works  in  the  natural  world 
increases  as  the  theory  outperforms  rival  theories  in  increasingly  complex 
experimental environments.  In fact, it would seem logical to follow a laboratory 
study with a field experiment, that is, a test in a restricted natural setting.  Field 
experiments are usually expensive, and as a consequence they are rare. 
  One  important  issue  in  design  parallelism  is  the  appropriate  amount  of 
information  to  give  subjects.    For  example,  a  minimal  test  of  the  behavioral 
assumptions  of  an  oligopoly  or  game  theory  should reproduce the informational 
environment that is assumed in the theory, even though this may require much more 
precise information than is typically possessed by firms in industrial markets.  On the 
other hand, experiments in which traders do not know each other's costs and values, 
such as Smith's (1962) initial market experiments, can be appropriately viewed both 
as  sensitivity  tests  and  as  efforts  to  discover  stylized  facts  in  “realistic” 
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environments.  Therefore, the degree of design parallelism depends on the purpose 




  Although the discussion above may appear somewhat abstract, it is important 
to emphasize that it has is a very practical side.  Those familiar with experimental 
methods simply will not take the results of an experiment seriously unless it satisfies 
some  basic  procedural  standards.    The  most  common  “fatal  errors”  made  by 
inexperienced researchers are:  
   
 failure to use complete and unbiased instructions 
 failure to use salient financial rewards  
 failure to include a baseline control treatment that calibrates results 
  failure  to  restrict  focus  on  a  few  treatments  of  interest  that  do  not 
change too many things at once  
 failure to choose the degree of institutional complexity appropriate to 
the problem being investigated  
 
Any  one  of  these  failures  pretty  much  renders  results  meaningless,  even  if  the 
experiment is otherwise carefully conceived and reported.  Finally, although these 
mistakes are readily spotted by the critic after the experiment is conducted, they can 
only be corrected before collecting data.  A little extra planning and reflection prior 




1.7 Laboratory Trading Institutions 
   
  Economists have traditionally viewed economic problems almost exclusively 
in  terms  of  structural  characteristics,  such  as  the  number  of  agents,  their 
endowments,  initial  information,  preferences,  costs,  and  productive  technologies.  
These structural characteristics, which must be induced in an experiment, are often 
referred  to  as  the  environment.    The  discovery  of  the  behavioral  importance  of 
trading rules by Smith and others has led economists to reconsider the importance of 
institutions.  In a loose sense, a market institution specifies the rules that govern the 
economic  interaction:  the  nature  and  timing  of  messages  and  decisions,  and  the 
mapping from these messages and decisions to the traders' monetary earnings.  
     Adding a specification of a trading institution to the analysis of an economic 
problem is consistent with the analytic approach taken by game theorists: both the 
game  theorist  and  the  experimentalist  will  assert  that  a  full  articulation  of  the 
problem's  institutional  and  environmental  components  is  necessary.    The  game 
theorist,  however,  uses  somewhat  different  terminology.    The  articulation  of  a 34                                                                                                               CHAPTER 1 
 
problem for the game theorist requires identification of each of the components of an 
extensive-form game that maps vectors of feasible strategies into utility “payoffs” for 
each player.  Relevant components are comprised of a series of  factors, which 
include  the  number  of  players,  their  payoff  functions,  and  their  knowledge 
(information sets).
38  There is no simple correspondence between the game-theoretic 
and experimental terminology.  For example, some payoff-relevant factors, such as 
commissions  and transactions  taxes, can be considered to be components of the 
trading institution.  Other payoff-relevant factors, such as values or costs, define 
components of the environment.  Each terminology has its benefits, and at various 
points each will be used.
39 
   Regardless of the type of experiment or the focus of investigation, institutional 
rules and other environmental features must be specified.  Most advanced theory 
texts do not pay much attention to institutional rules.  For example, at the outset of a 
typical text, a tatonnement mechanism with its famous hypothetical auctioneer may 
be  presented  to  justify  price-taking  competitive  behavior.    In  a  tatonnement 
mechanism, an auctioneer calls out a series of prices.  Each agent responds to the 
announcements by truthfully indicating a quantity that the agent desires to purchase 
or sell at the price under consideration.  In this sense, traders are “price takers.”  A 
competitive,  binding  allocation  occurs  when  quantity  supplied  equals  quantity 
demanded.
40  Competitive outcomes are assumed in the typical microeconomics text, 
at  least  until  a  chapter  on  imperfect  competition  that  is  likely  to  motivate 
noncompetitive outcomes with other institutions, such as the Cournot quantity-choice 
model, which (strictly speaking) rarely exists in naturally occurring markets.
41  This 
neglect of institutional detail is unfortunate, since seemingly small alterations in the 
laboratory trading rules can have large effects, both on game-theoretic predictions 
and on observed behavior.  Therefore, issues of institutional design are central in 
experimental economics.   
  Experimentalists tend to classify experiments by both the institution and the 
subfield of economics that provides the research hypotheses.  These two dimensions 
are closely related in practice.  For example, Smith's double auctions are commonly 
used in the study of financial markets.  Institutions with publicly posted list prices are 
commonly used in the analysis of retail markets with many small buyers.    The 
organization  of  this  book,  therefore,  is  largely  determined  by  the  sequence  of 
institutions  considered.    For   this  reason,  a  description  of  the commonly  used  
                                                 
     
38  These terms are discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
     
39  The  terminology  of  the  experimentalist  has  the  advantage  of  forcing  consideration  of  the 
manipulable components of an economic process even in instances where the structure of the game is too 
complicated to allow game-theoretic equilibrium analysis.  
     
40  Price vectors, rather than single prices, are called out by the auctioneer in a multimarket setting. 
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laboratory institutions will provide a useful overview of the remainder of the book.  
It is also important to see how different institutions are related, since the intuition 
gained by observing trading in one institution can help one understand behavior in 
closely related contexts.  
  The essential differences between the initially bewildering array of laboratory 
institutions  to  be  encountered  are  listed  in  tables  1.3  and  1.4.    The  tables  are 
distinguished by the timing of decisions.  Simpler environments, where decisions are 
made independently (and in this sense simultaneously), are summarized in table 1.3. 
 Table  1.4  summarizes  more  complex  institutions  where  decisions  are  made 
sequentially, and in real time.  In each table, the name of the institution is listed in 
the left column.  The second column indicates the numbers of sellers and buyers, 
where a dash corresponds to any integer, and the special cases of one seller or one 
buyer are indicated with the number 1.  The parenthetical notation in the second 
column indicates the number of units to be sold in auctions with an exogenously 
fixed  supply.    The  third  column  shows  whether  buyers  or  sellers  send  price 
messages,  which  are  called  “bids”  for  buyers  or  “offers”  or  “asking  prices”  for 
sellers.  The fourth column indicates whether messages are made simultaneously or 
sequentially.  The final column, on the right side of the table, shows who responds to 
price proposals and how contracts are confirmed. 
  The  remainder  of  this  section  summarizes principal characteristics of these 
trading institutions.  The discussion is divided into two subsections; simultaneous-




Institutions Involving Simultaneous Decisions 
 
  It is natural to begin this discussion with the simple quantity-choice framework 
first articulated by Cournot (1838), because much of oligopoly theory is formulated 
in terms of this institution.  In the Cournot institution, seller subjects select quantities 
simultaneously, and then each seller is told the aggregate quantity selected by all 
sellers.    This  market  quantity  determines  price  according  to  a  simulated-buyer 
inverse demand schedule, which can be given to subjects in tabular form.  Subjects 
use their own cost information to calculate their money profits.  Subjects may or may 
not have complete information about other sellers' costs.  As summarized in the first 
row of table 1.3, there can be any number of buyers and sellers, and no one sends 
price  messages,  since price is endogenous.
42  An important disadvantage of this 
Cournot (posted quantity) institution is that critical behavioral assumptions are built 
into  it;  the  implicit  assumption  is  that,  after  output  quantities  are  produced, 
                                                 
     
42  The Cournot institution has been used in experiments by Carlson (1967), Holt (1985), Holt and 
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competition  will  drive  price  down  (up) to the level at which there is no excess  
supply (demand). 
 
   
  The most prominent alternative to the Cournot model of quantity competition 
is the Bertrand (1883) model of price competition.  An important implication of the 
Bertrand model is that price competition can lead to competitive outcomes, even in 
highly concentrated markets.  Given a homogeneous product, excess capacity, and 
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simultaneous  price  postings,  this  result  follows,  since  each  seller  always  has  an 
incentive to undercut any common supracompetitive price.  The extremity of this 
prediction  has  led  some  commentators  to  defend  the  Cournot  model  as  a  more 
reasonable predictor of the outcome of price competition in markets with few sellers. 
 For example, Spence (1976, p. 235) notes that “the quantity version captures a part 
of  the  tacit  coordination  to  avoid  all-out  price  competition,  that  I  believe 
characterizes most industries.”  Hart (1979, p. 28) makes a similar argument:  “We 
reject the Bertrand approach because it has the implausible implication that perfect 
competition is established even under duopoly.”  These arguments, however, cannot 
be used to justify the exogenous imposition of the Cournot institution in laboratory 
markets.  Indeed the arguments suggest the opposite: that is, the use of a price-choice 
institution to see whether the resulting prices approximate the level determined by 
the equilibrium in a Cournot quantity-choice game. 
  The Cournot institution is reasonably used in experimental analysis to test the 
predictions of theories built on a Cournot model.  However, both theories and tests 
of theories that more explicitly address the mechanics of price determination will 
allow more direct insights into the dynamics of naturally occurring processes.  
For this reason, it is desirable to implement an institution where fewer behavioral 
assumptions are “hard wired” into the trading mechanism.  Bertrand models with 
price-setting firms have the distinct advantage of having a direct analogue in those 
natural markets where sellers independently post and advertise a price.   
  Instances where sellers publicly post “list” prices are common: sellers quote 
prices  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis  in  many  retail  and  mail-order  situations,  for 
example.    Laboratory  implementations  of  this  price-setting  activity  are  typically 
operationalized in the form of a posted-offer auction.  In this institution, sellers 
independently select a price and a maximum quantity limit.  After prices and quantity 
limits have been selected, the prices are displayed on the blackboard or on all traders' 
computer screens.  Then buyers are chosen randomly from a waiting mode.  The first 
buyer selected makes purchases from sellers at their posted prices.  When a buyer 
has purchased all desired units, another buyer is selected randomly and is given the 
same opportunity.  The trading period ends when all buyers have had an opportunity 
to shop or when all sellers are out of stock.  Then earnings are calculated, and a new 
period  typically  follows.    The  characteristics  of  the  posted-offer  auction  are 
summarized in the second row of table 1.3.   
    Allowing one side of the market to post terms of trade on a nonnegotiable basis 
represents an important behavioral asymmetry.  To anticipate these effects, imagine a 
bilateral monopoly situation in which a single unit may be traded.  The seller has a 
cost  of  $1.00,  and  the  buyer  has  a  value  of  $2.00.    With  unstructured  bilateral 
bargaining, one would expect the traders to reach a price agreement somewhere in 
the middle.  But if the trading institution enables the seller to post a take-it-or-leave-
it price offer, one would expect the seller to extract the bulk of the available surplus. 
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demands  are  somewhat  tempered  in  this  context,  as  agents  sometimes  refuse  to 
complete contracts proposed on very inequitable terms (see chapter 5).  A posted-
offer  institution  with  one  seller  and  one  buyer,  and  where  only  a  single  unit  is 
exchanged, is referred to as an ultimatum bargaining game.  The characteristics of 
this game are summarized in row 3 of table 1.3.  The intuition provided by the 
ultimatum  game  carries  over  somewhat  to  posted-offer  oligopoly  cases:    in 
laboratory experiments, the overall effect of allowing sellers to post offers is to raise 
prices and reduce market efficiency (Plott and Smith, 1978, and Plott, 1986a).
43  The 
effects of posted-pricing are considered in detail in chapter 4.  
  There are a number of closely related institutions in which some agents post 
terms  of  agreement  on  a  nonnegotiable  basis.    Characteristics  of  these  related 
institutions are listed in the remaining rows of table 1.3.  Reversing the roles of 
buyers  and  sellers  in  a  posted  offer  (i.e.,  allowing  buyers  to  post  bids  and 
subsequently selecting sellers in random order to make sales decisions) implements 
the posted-bid auction, which is characterized in the fourth row.  The case where 
buyers submit posted bids to a single seller, who offers some fixed number of units, 
N, to the highest bidders, generates a discriminative auction, summarized in the fifth 
row of the table.  For example, if two units are offered for sale and four bidders 
submit bids of 15, 17, 10, and 9, then the first two bidders obtain the units at prices 
of 15 and 17 respectively.  This auction is called discriminative since winners must 
pay  their  own  bid  prices,  and  in  this  sense  the  seller  engages  in  “price 
discrimination.”  The U.S. Treasury uses a variation of a discriminatory auction to 
sell Treasury bills to major buyers each week.  When there is only one unit or 
“prize,” the high bidder in a discriminative auction wins the auction and purchases it 
at his/her bid price, which is the highest, or “first” price.  Therefore, a discriminative 
auction with a single unit is sometimes called a first-price sealed-bid auction.  In 
contrast to the discriminative case, it is possible to design a mechanism for selling 
multiple units in which all of the N highest (winning) bidders pay a uniform price.  
When the uniform price is specified to be the highest rejected bid, the institution is 
known as a competitive auction.  In the previous example, with two units and bids of 
15, 17, 10, and 9, the first two bidders obtain the units, but they pay the same price, 
10.  Since all winning bidders pay the same market-clearing price, this institution can 
create an impression of fairness.  A  second-price auction is a special case of a 
competitive sealed-bid auction with only one prize; the highest rejected bid is the 
second highest price, which is what the winning bidder must pay.  One issue to be 
considered in chapter 5 is whether sales revenues are higher with a discriminative or 
a competitive auction. 
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  As  a  final  simultaneous-choice  institution,  we  mention  the  clearinghouse 
auction, summarized in the bottom row of table 1.3.  This auction is two-sided; 
buyers submit bids and sellers submit offers.  Once submitted, bids are arrayed in 
descending  order,  from  highest  to  lowest,  while  offers  are  arrayed  in  ascending 
order, from lowest to highest.  A price is then determined by a crossing of the bid 
and offer arrays.  This two-sided institution eliminates the performance asymmetries 
associated  with  allowing  only  one  side  of  the  market  to  submit  price  quotes.  
Variants of the clearinghouse auction are used in stock exchanges.  For example, the 
New York Stock Exchange opens each day with a clearinghouse auction, prior to 
commencing trades on a continuous basis.  Several European stock exchanges are 
organized exclusively on clearinghouse rules (Van Boening, 1990).  Experiments 
regarding  some  variants  of  the  clearinghouse  auction,  which  are  either  currently 
being used or proposed, are reviewed in chapter 5.  
 
Institutions Involving Sequential Decisions  
 
  We  turn  our  attention  now  to  markets  where  agents  make  key  decisions 
sequentially and in real time.  These institutions, summarized in table 1.4, are much 
more difficult to analyze theoretically than those presented in table 1.3, but they are 
closer  to  institutional  rules  in  many  financial,  commodities,  and  producer goods 
markets.  We proceed from the most complex institution, Chamberlin's decentralized 
negotiations listed at the bottom of table 1.4, and work up the table. 
  As noted earlier, Chamberlin's subjects were allowed to roam freely around the 
room and negotiate contracts.  Each seller (buyer) had one unit that could be sold 
(purchased) with a cost (reservation value) listed on a card.  After a contract was 
completed, the buyer and seller would report the price to the professor's desk, and 
the price was usually written on the blackboard at the time it was reported.  The most 
striking departure from the competitive outcome predicted by the intersection of the 
induced supply and demand curves was the tendency for quantity exchanged to be 
too high. 
  Chamberlin attributed the high sales quantity to the decentralized nature of the 
bargaining process.  He supported this conjecture with a simulation in which he first 
constructed a series of submarkets by randomly drawing three buyer cards and three 
seller cards drawn from a deck of cost and value cards, and enacting all trades that 
would occur in a competitive equilibrium for the submarket.  Cards for units that 
were not traded were returned to the deck, and the process was repeated many times. 
 This simulation generated transaction quantities that exceeded the competitive level, 
and  the  excess  quantity  declined  as  the  size  of  the  simulated  submarkets  was 
increased.  (Note the difference between an experiment with human traders and a 
simulation with artificial agents that follow exogenously specified decision rules.) 
  To  understand  how  decentralized  negotiations  can  result  in  high  trading 
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figure 1.2 and summarized in the rightmost column of table 1.1.  Note that up to 
twelve units can trade in this market (five more than the competitive quantity), but 
prices must be quite variable to generate (inefficient) trades of extra-marginal units 
with high costs or low values.  While centralized bid and offer information would 
tend to eliminate trades involving extra-marginal units, the absence of information on 
the bid-ask spread in decentralized markets would facilitate the consummation of 
these inefficient contracts. 
    Subsequent  experimental  results  are  largely  consistent  with  Chamberlin's 
explanation of excess-quantity with decentralized trading.  Although the earnings in 
Chamberlin's experiment were hypothetical, Hong and Plott (1982) observed excess 
trading volume in decentralized trading among financially motivated subjects who 
communicated with each other bilaterally by telephone.
44  
                                                 
     
44  One apparent exception to this excess-quantity result is Joyce (1983), who observed only small 
quantity increases in “Chamberlin” markets (with decentralized trading among subjects walking around a 
room) over symmetric double-auction markets of the type used by Smith (1962).  A closer examination of 
Joyce's structure, however, suggests that, if anything, the relatively small quantity increases observed by 
Joyce actually support the excess-quantity hypothesis.  Joyce's supply and demand arrays allowed for the 
possible trade of only one extra-marginal unit; his design is quite similar to the design in figure 1.2 if one 
were to remove the second, high-cost units for sellers S2-S5 and the second, low-value units for buyers 
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  Smith (1962, 1964) induced more price uniformity and fewer extra-marginal 
trades with his double auction.  Under double-auction rules, any buyer who makes a 
bid must raise his/her hand and be recognized.  The bid is then publicly announced 
to the market.  Sellers' offers are also publicly announced.  All bids and offers are 
written on the blackboard as they are made.  Only the most attractive bid or offer has 
“standing” or can be accepted.  Any buyer is free at any time to accept a standing 
offer, and any seller can accept a standing bid.  It is a common practice to add an 
“improvement rule,” that is, that a new bid be greater than the standing bid and that a 
new offer be lower than the standing offer.  This is a double auction in the sense that 
bids rise, as in a typical auction for antiques, and offers fall at the same time.  The 
acceptance of a bid or offer constitutes a binding contract that typically invalidates 
all previous bids and offers, but new bids or offers can be tendered.  After time 
allotted to the market period is over, the market closes, and subjects calculate their 
earnings.
45  Then the market reopens, usually with the same initial endowments of 
unit values or costs for each buyer or seller, and with no inventory carryover.  Under 
these stationary market conditions, the aggregate demand and supply functions are 
the same at the beginning of each period.  Traders are normally given no information 
about the values and costs of other traders. 
  Smith (1976) recalls that he “did not seriously expect competitive price theory 
to be supported,” but that the double auction would give the theory its best chance.  
Smith's experiments generally produced prices and quantities that were surprisingly 
near competitive levels, although some marginally profitable units did not always 
trade, for example, the units of traders B1 and S1 in figure 1.2.   
  Due to its impressively robust performance, the double auction is probably the 
most  commonly  used  laboratory  trading  mechanism.    Such  auctions  are  often 
conducted  on  either  a  mainframe  computer  network,  such  as  the  University  of 
Illinois' NovaNet computer system (formerly PLATO), or on a network of personal 
computers.  Williams (1980) and Smith and Williams (1981, 1983) describe other 
details  of  the  NovaNet  (PLATO)  implementation.    In  particular,  there  is  an 
improvement rule and a “rank queue,” which stores ranked bids that are below the 
highest  outstanding  bid  (or  inversely  ranked  offers  that  are  above  the  lowest 
outstanding offer).
46  An improvement rule with a rank-ordered queue (an electronic 
“specialist's book”) provides the least variability in observed prices, and this is the 
rule  that  implements  the  prominent  features  of  trading  on  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange. 
                                                                                                                                    
B3-B6.  Then, at most, the excess quantity could be one unit, and the resulting efficiency loss would be 
small if the difference between cost and value of the extra-marginal units were small, as was the case in 
his experiment. 
     
45  A market period lasts from three to ten minutes, depending on the numbers of traders and units 
being traded. 
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  The striking competitive tendency of the double-auction institution, which has 
been confirmed by hundreds of sessions in a variety of designs, indicates that neither 
complete  information  nor  large  numbers  of  traders  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
convergence to competitive equilibrium outcomes.  Smith (1976, p. 57) concludes: 
 
  There are no experimental results more important or more significant 
than that the information specifications of traditional competitive price 
theory are grossly overstated.  The experimental facts are that no double 
auction trader needs to know anything about the valuation conditions of 
other traders, or have any understanding or knowledge of market supply 
and  demand  conditions,  or  have  any  trading  experience  (although 
experience may speed convergence) or satisfy the quaint and irrelevant 
requirement of being a price “taker” (every trader is a price maker in the 
double auction). 
  
  The third and fourth rows of table 1.4 describe two simple variations on the 
double  auction  where  only  sellers  or  only  buyers  make  price  quotes:    An  offer 
auction is an institution in which sellers can make offers sequentially, and buyers are 
able to accept any offer, but not to make bids.  This institution may approximate the 
way  consumers  use  travel  agents  to  purchase  tickets  via  computerized  airline 
reservations networks.  Conversely, a bid auction refers to the opposite case in which 
buyers  can  make  bids  sequentially,  but  sellers  can  only  indicate  that  a  bid  is 
accepted.    In  markets  with  at  least  four  buyers  and  four  sellers,  the  effects  of 
differences between these three institutions are apparently minor, at least for some 
supply and demand parameterizations.
47  Finally, note that a bid auction with a single 
seller is essentially an English auction (but with no auctioneer) in which the seller 
waits while bids rise until only one active bidder remains.  This is the familiar type of 
auction used for antiques and art, and its characteristics are shown in the second row 
of table 1.4.  The top row of the table pertains to a Dutch auction, in which a single 
selling agent lowers the price sequentially until a buyer agrees to pay the seller's 
price.  Often the prices are indicated by a mechanical pointer, like the hand of a 
clock, which falls over a price scale until a buyer presses a button to stop the clock.  
The first buyer to do this obtains a unit at the price in effect at the time that the clock 
was stopped.  The Dutch auction derives its name from its extensive use in wholesale 
flower markets in Holland.   
 
                                                 
     
47  Smith (1964) initially observed a consistent ranking: bid-auction prices  >  double-auction prices  
>  offer-auction prices.  But there is no theoretical basis for expecting such a ranking to occur generally, 
and this pattern did not appear in a subsequent experiment conducted under a different parameterization 





  There are many ways to alter the institutions described in this section.  These 
alternatives deserve serious consideration.  In particular, the double auction and the 
posted-offer  auction  are relied on too extensively, the double auction because it 
yields predictable competitive results in most contexts, and the posted-offer auction 
because it is simple to implement. 
  Consider, for example, two recent modifications of the posted offer.  First, 
recall the standard restriction that sellers may not make sales at prices below the 
posted price in either a Bertrand game or the posted-offer auction that implements it. 
 Buyers solicit and obtain price concessions from sellers in a wide variety of natural 
markets, particularly markets for producer goods and consumer durables.  In contrast 
to the double auction, where price reductions are public and nonselective in the sense 
that  any  price  reduction  is  offered  to  all  buyers,  price  concessions  in  many 
decentralized markets are private and selective.  Indeed, the apparent absence of 
secret discounts from list prices was one of the factors that triggered the Federal 
Trade  Commission  investigation  of  contractual  practices  of  lead-based  gasoline 
additive producers (the Ethyl case).
48   
  Experiments with discounts from posted list prices are relatively rare.  Grether 
and  Plott  (1984),  motivated  by  the  Ethyl  case,  conducted  experiments  in  which 
sellers'  list  prices  were  communicated  electronically  to  buyers  and  sellers  in 
individual rooms.  Then buyers could contact sellers by telephone to seek discounts, 
subject to contractual constraints that were the target of the FTC litigation.   
  More  recently,  Davis  and  Holt  (1991)  have  implemented  a  list/discount 
institution in which sellers post prices at their computer terminals, as in a posted- 
offer auction, and buyers are selected from a waiting queue in a random sequence.  
Once selected, a buyer can request a discount, and the seller may or may not respond 
with a price reduction for that buyer.  Davis and Holt report that sellers do discount 
if permitted, but that discounting opportunities do not necessarily make the pricing 
situation more competitive.  Although this research is preliminary, one important 
result is that sellers will offer discounts if given the opportunity.  Therefore, the 
posting of a single, nonnegotiable price in the standard posted-offer institution is an 
important restriction, and data from posted-offer markets should be interpreted with 
care.   
  A second and quite interesting variation of the posted offer is the introduction 
of continuous trading in a real-time context.  Millner, Pratt, and Reilly (1990a and 
1990b) have developed a flow-market version of the posted-offer institution.  Sellers 
can alter prices at any instant, and the simulated demand determines sales flows per 
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unit of time as a function of the prices.  Although flow markets are difficult to 
analyze theoretically, they introduce an element of realism that, as we shall see, is 
especially useful in the analysis of “hit-and-run” entry. 
 
 
1.8 Conclusion and Overview 
 
  Laboratory methods have provided economists with a level of replicability and 
control that was not previously available.  Moreover, as illustrated by the effects of 
changes in trading rules on market performance, it is clear that experiments can be 
used to demonstrate the importance of variables typically thought to be unimportant 
in  explaining  behavior.   Thus, experimentation holds out the promise of a new, 
symbiotic relationship between economic theory and evidence.   
  Experiments also provide an inexpensive way to examine various economic 
policy proposals, and while the results of policy experiments are seldom definitive, 
the presumption is that what does not work in simple situations should not work in 
more  complex  natural  environments.    Thus,  experimentation  may  allow 
identification of proposals that are unlikely to be effective, and this can shift the 
burden  of  proof  for  policy  proposals  that  do  exhibit  predicted  results  in  the 
laboratory.    
  Experiments  have  been  used  to  evaluate  performance  in  a  wide  variety  of 
trading institutions.  It is easiest to derive the implications of relevant theories in 
more structured institutions.  More complicated institutions, especially those that 
allow discounting and active buyer shopping for discounts, are difficult to analyze 
but generate environments that are appropriate for the study of markets with large 
buyers.    Posted-offer  and  double-auction  markets  represent  the  most  thoroughly 
investigated institutions.  The posted-offer institution is easy to implement and is a 
good approximation of the pricing process in retail situations in which the seller 
prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  Informationally rich double-auction markets 
correspond  to  the  open  trading  that  occurs  in  many  centralized  stock  markets.  
Extensions  of  posted-offer  and  double-auction  institutions  deserve  serious 
consideration.   
  The  remainder  of  this  text  is  devoted  to  the  techniques  and  lessons  of 
experimental investigation in economics.  The discussion begins, in chapter 2, with 
an introduction to topics in individual decision theory and game theory.  This chapter 
has  a  dual  purpose:    first,  it  reviews  (or  perhaps  introduces)  some  essential 
theoretical assumptions and tools used in the remainder of the manuscript.  Second, 
it  introduces  some  useful  experimental  techniques  for  evaluating  these elements.  
Given this foundation, we turn our attention to the behavioral consequences of a 
variety of trading institutions.  Double-auction markets are the subject of chapter 3, 
while  posted-offer  markets  are  the  subject  in  chapter  4.    The  fifth  chapter  then 
considers  a  variety  of  additional  institutions,  ranging  from  very  simple  trading 
mechanisms,  such  as  bilateral  bargaining  and  uniform  price  auctions,  to  more INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW                                                                               45 
 
sophisticated  mechanisms,  such  as  variants  of  the  clearinghouse  auction.    Some 
prominent areas where experiments have been used are considered in the next two 
chapters.  Chapter 6 discusses experiments involving public goods and externalities, 
and chapter 7 discusses experiments designed to investigate problems of asymmetric 
information.  Chapter 8 contains a somewhat more technically demanding discussion 
of  individual  choice  experiments.    We  conclude  the  book  by  returning  to  a 
discussion  of  experimental  methodology.    Chapter  9  discusses  the  relationship 
between research objectives, experimental design, and statistical analysis of data.  
This final chapter is essential for readers who wish to make the transition from 
reviewing prior experimental results to doing their own original research.
49  
                                                 
     
49  A  teacher  using this material as a course reference may wish to deviate from this order of 
presentation.  In a one-semester undergraduate course, one could truncate the discussion of chapter 2, and 
then follow chapters 3 and 4 with the applications discussions in chapters 6 and 7.  Topics in chapters 5, 8 






  This appendix contains instructions for administering an oral double auction.  
The instructions are based on those widely used in experimental economics, but they 
are written for demonstration rather than research purposes.
50  It is assumed that 
neither  the  experiment  administrator  nor  the  participants  have  experience  with 
double  auctions.    Additional  examples  and  explanations  have  been  added  to 
anticipate many common mistakes and questions.  Some of the explanations may 
consequently seem rather tedious to an experimentalist, and some of the sequences 
of bids and offers in the Trading Rules section may be a little too suggestive of 
actual trading strategies for research purposes.  To adapt these instructions for use as 
a research tool, we suggest removing the material marked with brackets.   
  This appendix is divided into two parts.  The first part contains instructions for 
participants, while the second part presents a detailed list of administrative tasks 
associated with conducting a laboratory market session.  Although many of these 
tasks also apply to other types of experiments, the discussion here is in terms of a 
double  auction,  since  lists  of  procedural  guidelines  are  both  clearer  and  more 
interesting when they are presented in the context of a specific experiment.  Tasks 
necessary for a classroom demonstration are marked with an asterisk to distinguish 
them from those that are only necessary for research purposes.
51  Most of the lists are 
also relevant if the experiment is computerized, but fewer assistants and less paper 
and preparation materials are required. 
 
                                                 
     
50  There are a variety of instances where one might use a laboratory trading session for purposes of 
demonstration.    In  particular,  it  is  useful  to  conduct  a  double  auction  in  an  initial  meeting  of  an 
experimental economics course, before students have done any reading in chapter 1.  An exercise of this 
type not only demonstrates the robust convergence of the double auction, but it also directs the attention 
of students to the links between theoretical predictions and evidence.  The authors often have participants 
record data from the classroom session, as well as the underlying cost and value parameters for the 
market.  Students are then asked to consider theories explaining why the (typically rather stable) series of 
prices was observed.  A subsequent class discussion would focus on the empirical consequences of 
theories, and on how the predictions of rival theories may be behaviorally distinguished. 
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A1.1  Oral Double-Auction Instructions [for demonstration] 
 
  Today we are going to set up a market in which some of you will be buyers and 
others will be sellers.  The commodity to be traded is divided into distinct items or 
“units.”  We will not specify a name for the commodity; we will simply refer to 
units.   
  Trading  will  occur  in  a  sequence  of  trading  periods.    The  prices  that  you 
negotiate in each trading period will determine your earnings, in dollars and cents.  
You will keep track of these earnings on the forms provided.  [These earnings are 
hypothetical; nobody will make or receive actual cash payments.]
52  
  We will proceed in the following way.  First I will explain how buyers and 
sellers compute their earnings, and then I will explain how sales and purchases are 
arranged in the market.  Importantly, these instructions explain how both sellers and 
buyers calculate earnings and negotiate contracts.  In today's market, however, you 
will be either a buyer or a seller.  Information specific to your role in today's market 
will be presented to you at the end of the instructions.  After reading the instructions 
and  reviewing  your  specific  information,  I  will  give  you  a  chance  to  ask  any 
questions you might have.  Then we will begin the first trading period. 
 
Instructions for Sellers 
 
  Seller decisions and earnings will be recorded on a sheet similar to the Seller 
Decision Sheet, shown below.  Trading periods are designated by separate columns. 
 In each trading period, a seller may sell up to two units.  For the first unit that may 
be sold during a period, the seller incurs a cost of the amount listed in row 2, marked 
“cost of 1st unit.”  If a second unit is sold during the same period, the seller incurs 
the cost listed in row 5, marked “cost of 2nd unit.”  A seller may sell one or both 
units in a period and may sell to either a single buyer or different buyers. 
  Sellers earn money by selling units at prices that are above their costs. Earnings 
from the sale of each unit are computed by taking the difference between the sales 
price and the unit cost.  Total earnings for the period are computed by adding up the 
earnings on all units sold. 
  Consider, for example, trades in period 0 of the Seller Decision Sheet.  In this 
practice period, the cost for the first unit is $130, and the cost for the second unit is 
$140, as shown in rows 2 and 5.  Suppose a seller negotiates sales of both units in 
period 0; the first unit for a price of $190 and the second unit for a price of $160.   
To  record  these  sales,  please  enter  $190  in row 1 and $160 in row 4 of the Seller  
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Decision Sheet.  Remember to stay in the shaded column for period 0.    
  Earnings on the sale of the first unit are obtained by subtracting the cost in row 
2, which is $130, from the selling price in row 1, which is $190.  The difference of 
$60 should be entered in row 3 at this time.  Similarly, everyone should compute the 
earnings from the sale of the second unit and enter it in row 6.  Total earnings for the 
period would be the sum of $60 (on the first unit sold) and $20 (on the second unit 
sold).  If this were not a practice period, this sum of $80 would now be entered in 
row 7.  Earnings in this example are for illustrative purposes only; actual earnings 
will be lower. 
  Subsequent periods are represented by numbered columns: period 1, period 2, 
etc.  The blanks in each column of the Seller Decision Sheet will help sellers to keep 
track of their earnings in a period.  But please remember: all calculations for each 
period should be reflected in the column for that period.   
 
  SELLER DECISION SHEET for SELLER ________ 
 
    trading period 
 




  1    selling price         
    2    cost of 1st unit    $130       




  4    selling price         
    5    cost of 2nd unit    $140       
    6    earnings         
    7  total earnings 
for the period 
(not 
 paid) 
     
    8    cumulative 
  earnings 
 $0.00       
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  Importantly, a seller does not incur the cost for a unit unless the unit is sold.  
Thus, earnings for each unsold unit in a period are zero.  If you are a seller, the first 
unit you sell during a trading period is your “1st unit,” regardless of whether or not 
other sellers have previously sold units in the period.  The sale price for your first 
unit should be recorded in row 1 immediately after the sale, and the earnings should 
be recorded in row 3.  If you sell a second unit, record its sale price in row 4 
immediately.  You cannot sell your second unit before your first unit, and therefore 
you will move down a column during a period.  Units listed on adjacent columns are 
unavailable until subsequent trading periods.  At the end of the period, record your 
total earnings in row 7 of your decision sheet.  Earnings for subsequent periods will 
be calculated similarly, and you should keep track of your cumulative earnings in the 
bottom row of the decision sheet. 
 
Instructions for Buyers 
 
  Buyer decisions and earnings will be recorded on a sheet similar to the Buyer 
Decision Sheet, shown below.  This sheet is formatted in a manner parallel to the 
Seller Decision sheet, with trading periods designated by separate columns.  In each 
trading period, a buyer may purchase up to two units.  For the first unit that may be 
bought during a period, the buyer receives the amount listed in row 1, marked “value 
of 1st unit.”  If a second unit is purchased during the same period, the buyer receives 
the additional amount listed in row 4, marked “value of 2nd unit.”  A buyer may 
purchase one or both units in a period and may buy from either a single seller or 
different sellers.   
  Buyers earn money by purchasing units at prices that are below their values. 
Earnings  from  the  purchase  of  each  unit  are  computed  by  taking  the  difference 
between the value of the unit and the purchase price.  Total earnings for the period 
are computed by adding up the earnings on all units purchased. 
  Consider, for example, purchases in period 0 of the Buyer Decision Sheet.  In 
this practice period, the value of the first unit is $210 and the value of the second unit 
is $170, as shown in rows 1 and 4.  Suppose a buyer negotiates the purchase of two 
units in period 0; the first unit for a price of $160 and the second unit for a price of 
$150.  To record these purchases, please enter $160 in row 2 and $150 in row 5 of 
the Buyer Decision Sheet.  Remember to stay in the shaded column for period 0. 
  Earnings  on  the  purchase  of  the  first  unit  are  obtained  by  subtracting  the 
purchase price in row 2, which is $160, from the value in row 1, which is $210.  The 
difference of $50 should be entered in row 3 at this time.  Next, everyone should 
compute the earnings from the purchase of the second unit and enter it in row 6.  
Total earnings for the period would be the sum of $50 (on the first unit purchased) 
and $20 (on second unit purchased).  If this were not a practice period, this sum of 
$70 would now be entered in row 7.  Earnings in this example are for illustrative 
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  Subsequent periods are represented by separate columns; period 1, period 2, 
etc.  The blanks in each column of the Buyer Decision Sheet will help buyers to keep 
track of their earnings in a period.  But please remember; all calculations for each 
period should be reflected in the column for that period. 
  Importantly, a buyer does not receive the value for a unit unless the unit is 
purchased.  Thus, earnings for each unpurchased unit in a period are zero.  If you are 
a buyer, the first unit that you purchase during a period is your “1st unit,” regardless 
of whether or not other buyers have previously bought units in the  period.  The 
purchase price for your 1st unit should be recorded in row 2 immediately after the 
purchase, and the earnings should be recorded in row 3.  If you buy a second unit, 
record its purchase price in row 5 immediately.  You cannot buy your second unit 
before your first unit.  Therefore, you will move down a column during a period.  
Units listed in subsequent columns are not available until subsequent trading periods. 
 At the end of the period, record your total earnings in row 7 of your decision sheet.  
 
 
  BUYER DECISION SHEET for BUYER ________ 
 
    trading period 




  1    value of 1st unit    $210       
    2    purchase price         




  4   value of 2nd unit    $170       
    5    purchase price         
    6    earnings         
    7  total earnings 
for the period 
  (not 
  paid) 
     
    8    cumulative 
  earnings 
 $0.00       
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Earnings for subsequent periods will be calculated similarly, and you should keep 




  I will begin each five-minute trading period with an announcement that the 
market is open.  At any time during the period, any buyer is free to raise his/her hand 
and, when called on, to make a verbal bid to buy a unit at a price specified in the bid. 
 Similarly, any seller is free to raise his/her hand and, when called on, to make a 
verbal offer to sell a unit at the price specified in the offer.  All bids and offers 
pertain to one unit, it is not possible to sell two units as a package. 
  All buyers and sellers have identification numbers; your number is given in the 
upper part of a Decision Sheet that is in your folder.  These numbers should be used 
when making a bid or offer.  Buyers should use the word “bid,” and sellers should 
use the word “ask.”  For example, if Buyer 1 wants to make a bid of $120, then this 
person would raise his/her hand and, when recognized, say “Buyer 1 bids $120.”  I 
will repeat the buyer number and the bid to give the person at the blackboard time to 
record it.  Similarly, if Seller 5 decides to offer a unit for sale at $250, this seller 
should raise his/her hand and, when recognized, say “Seller 5 asks $250.”  I will 
repeat this information while it is recorded, and the blackboard will appear 
 
  Bids    Asks 
 
  B1    120 
 
  S5    250 
 
 
  We ask you to help us enforce a bid/ask improvement rule:  All bids must be 
higher than the highest outstanding bid, should one exist, and asking prices must be 
lower than the lowest outstanding offer, should one exist.  In the example above, the 
next bid must be above $120, and the next ask must be below $250.   
 
[For example, suppose that Buyer 1, the next person recognized, raises his/her own 
bid from $120 to $130, and then Seller 4 is called on and asks $165.  I would repeat 
the bid and ask as they are recorded on the blackboard: 
 
  Bids    Asks 
 
  B1    120 
  B1    130 
 
  S5    250 
  S4    165 
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  To save space, the bids and asks will be written in small numbers, without the 
dollar signs and decimals.  Please tell us if you cannot read the numbers recorded or 
if you think that a bid or ask was not recorded correctly. 
  Any seller is free at any time to accept or not accept the bid of any buyer, and 
any buyer is free to accept or not accept the asking price of any seller.  To accept a 
bid or ask, simply raise your hand.  After you are recognized, announce your identity 
and indicate acceptance, e.g., Buyer 2 accepts Seller 3's ask.  
 
[Suppose that Buyer 3 bids $160, and that the next person recognized is Seller 5 
who  accepts  this  bid.    I  would  repeat  this  acceptance,  while  the  person  at  the 
blackboard circles the buyer number, seller number, and transactions price.  To see 
how  this  will  look,  please  draw  a  flat  circle  around  the  boldfaced  row  in  the 
following chart. 
 
  Bids    Asks 
 
  B1    120 
  B1    130 
  B3    160 
 
  S5    250 
  S4    165 
    S5 accepts 
 
 
Instead of accepting the bid of $160, Seller 5 could have stated an asking price that 
is below the highest outstanding bid, say at $150, but to do so would result in a 
lower sale price than could have been obtained by accepting the bid of $160.] 
 
  If a bid or ask is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single unit, 
and the buyer and seller involved will immediately record the contract price and 
earnings for the unit.  After each contract is closed, all previous bids and asks will be 
automatically withdrawn before any new ones can be made.   
 
  [Following the acceptance of Buyer 3's bid of $160, a horizontal line would 
have been drawn below the circled contract.  Subsequent bids need not be above 
$160 and in fact could be below any of the earlier bids.  The horizontal line is to 
remind you that the contract invalidates previous bids and asks. 
  If Seller 4 wished to ask $165 again, this seller would raise his/her hand and 
be recognized.  Suppose that Buyer 1 bids $140 and Buyer 3 is then recognized and 
accepts Seller 4's asking price.  The blackboard will appear as below, except that 






  Bids    Asks 
  B1    120 
  B1    130 
  B3    160 
 
  S5    250 
  S4    165 
    S5 accepts 
 
  B1    140 
   B3 accepts 





  Notice  that  Buyer  3  has  just  purchased  his/her  second  unit.    Instead  of 
accepting the lowest standing offer of $165, this buyer could have made a higher 
bid, say $170, but to do so would have resulted in a higher purchase price than 
could have been obtained by accepting the offer of $165.] 
  Except for bids, asks, and their acceptances, you are expected not to speak to 
any other person, even if there are many bids and offers that are not accepted. 
 
 
Procedural Details and Review 
 
  In your folder, you will find a sheet, labeled “Buyer Decision Sheet” or “Seller 
Decision Sheet.”  This sheet is separate from these instructions.  It identifies your 
role  as  a  buyer  or  seller  and  will  be  used  to  calculate  your  earnings.    THE 
INFORMATION ON THIS SHEET IS PRIVATE, PLEASE DO NOT REVEAL IT TO ANYONE. 
 Others may or may not have the same cost or value numbers that you have.  You 
should now look at your decision sheet to see whether you are a buyer or a seller.  
Has everyone done this?  Also, please note your identification number at the top of 
this sheet; this is how you will identify yourself during the trading process.   
  Now is the time for questions.  You may ask questions about any aspect of the 
market of which you are unsure.  However, be careful not to reveal the private cost 
or value information that appears on your decision sheet.  Are there any questions? 
 
  (Questions)   
 
  We are about to begin trading period 1.  Buyers should check the redemption 
values in rows 1 and 4 of the column for period 1.  Recall, the only way for a buyer 
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value.
53  Similarly, sellers should check the cost numbers in the column for period 1. 
 Recall, the only way for a seller to earn money on a unit is to sell it for a price that 
exceeds its cost.
54  Barring any further questions, we will begin trading period 1.  
Are there any remaining questions? 
 
  (Questions) 
 
 
Beginning the Session 
 
  The market is now open for bids and offers.  If you raise your hand, please do 
not speak until I call on you.  I will do my best to call on people in the order in which 
the hands went up, but if many hands go up at the same time I will have to choose 
between people in a nonsystematic way.  The period will last for ___ minutes and 
will end at _______.  Are there any bids or asks? 
 
  (After the first contract is made, but not after subsequent contracts, read the 
paragraph that follows.) 
 
  At this time the buyer and seller involved in this contract should record the 
price and calculate their earnings.  This buyer and seller now have finished with their 
first units, and the relevant value or cost for them is that of their second unit for 
period 1.  The rest of you are still considering the sale or purchase of your first unit 
in the period 1 column.  Remember that when you make a contract, you move down 
the column for the current period to your second unit; you do not move across a row 
until the beginning of the next period.  At this time, the recorder should draw a 
horizontal line below the final bids and asks.  There are ____ minutes remaining in 
period 1, and the market is open for bids and asks. 
 
  (At the appropriate times, the one-minute and 30-second warnings are given.  
At the end of the period, read:)  
 
  Period 1 has ended, and you should add up the earnings on units traded and 
enter the total in row 7 of the column for this period.  If you did not buy or sell a 
unit, the earnings for that unit are zero.  We will erase the blackboard as soon as all 
transaction prices are recorded.  At this time, one of us will come around to your 
desk to check your calculations.  Please do not talk with each other; if you have a 
question, raise your hand. 
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Ending the Session  (The following statement is to be read at the end of a research 
session.) 
 
  The final period has ended.  Please refrain from talking while you finish adding 
up your cumulative earnings across periods in row 8.  One of us will come around to 
assist  you  with  this  if  necessary.    Then  add  the  $_.__  participation  fee  (paid 
previously) to the total and round the result up to the nearest 25-cent increment (e.g., 
$5.35 becomes $5.50).  Enter the total on the receipt form that you will find in your 
folder.  Please fill out the rest of the receipt form, making sure that you include the 
date, your signature, and your social security number.  Then remain seated without 
talking until you are asked to take your receipt form to be paid.  Please leave all 
other materials in the folder on your desk.  Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
A1.2 Suggestions for Conducting an Oral Double Auction 
 
  This  section  contains  practical  considerations  that  may  help  in  the 
administration of an experiment.  Our suggestions are organized into a series of lists 
that address concerns in approximately chronological order.  The categories include 
experimental design, advance arrangements, preparation of folders and materials, 
recruiting, room preparation, starting the session, controlling the market trading, and 
ending the session. 
   Much more detailed planning is required for conducting a market for research 
than for demonstration purposes.  In the latter case, attention may be confined to 
comments marked with an asterisk.  Finally, although our listed considerations apply 
fairly generally to experimental sessions other than double-auction markets, they are 
not intended to be definitive in any application.  In designing and conducting an 
experiment,  the  researcher  should  keep  in  mind  the  general  principles  of 





  *1.  Decide on the numbers of buyers and sellers.  These numbers depend on 
the purpose and design of the experiment, but it is unwieldy to conduct an oral 
double auction with more than fifteen to twenty traders.  In addition, it is useful to 
have four extra people to help: 
 
  i.  an auctioneer to read instructions and recognize buyers and sellers  (this 
would be the instructor in a classroom demonstration) 
  ii.  a first recorder to record bids, asks, and contracts on the blackboard 
  iii.  a second recorder to record data on paper and keep time  
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  iv.  a monitor to check for illegal trades (e.g., trades at a loss if they are not 
permitted)  
 
If there are extra students present in a classroom demonstration, you can distribute 
decision  sheets  to  every  second  or  third  person  and  let  students  who  are  not 
participating assist those who are.     
  *2.  Decide on value and cost parameters.  The participant decision sheets in 
the instructions given above contain space for two units per person for a maximum 
of three trading periods.  Increases in the numbers of units or periods would require 
straightforward changes in the instructions and decision sheets.  No modification is 
necessary if you use variants of the design discussed in section 1.3 (summarized in 
table 1.1).
55 
  3.  Decide whether to permit trades at a loss (sales below cost or purchases 
above value).  In our experience, there will sometimes be trades at a loss in the first 
period  with  inexperienced  subjects.    If  trades  at  a  loss  are  not  permitted,  extra 
monitoring  will  be  required;  see  item  1.iv  in  this  list.    Even  if  such  trades  are 
permitted in a demonstration experiment, you may wish to explain (privately) why 
the trade will result in a loss. 
  4.  Decide on parameter shifts.  For research sessions, it is essential to avoid 
the possibility that prior expectations will affect behavior.  After a session ends and 
participants have left the room, they may talk with other potential participants.  In 
oral auctions, there is also the possibility that the auctioneer can affect outcomes, 
perhaps  inadvertently,  through  facial  expressions.    One  solution  is  to  add  a 
parameter-disguising constant to all values and costs, and to keep the auctioneer 
uninformed of the equilibrium price.  Decide on the length of the periods.  Trading 
will go more quickly after the first period or two, so shorter periods may be used in a 
research experiment if trading volume is not too large.  As a rough guide, count on 
about forty-five seconds per unit that is expected to trade.  Changes in the time limits 
will require obvious changes in the instructions. 
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and rival predictions such as monopoly, monopsony, and quantity maximization.  The numbers of buyers 
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additional buyer and seller pair may be added to table 1.1 as follows.  Key new buyer B7's values off of 
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S6's second unit to .10 more than the cost of S5's second unit.  The addition of trader pairs in this manner 




  1.  Hire four assistants to cover the roles described above, and stress the need 
to arrive on time.   
  2.  Instruct assistants not to talk unnecessarily during the experiment and not to 
provide suggestive or colorful answers to questions. 
  3.  Reserve the room for the time needed, plus about fifteen minutes before the 
starting  time  and  about  thirty  minutes  afterward,  to  reduce  “end-effects”  and  to 
prevent a situation in which students for an incoming class are crowding around the 
doorway. 
  4.  When paying earnings in cash, obtain sufficient change, usually a roll of 
quarters and the rest in $1, $5, and $10 bills.  Note that the maximum earnings may 
be calculated in advance as the product of the number of periods and the sum of 
buyers' and sellers' surplus.  To facilitate the making of change, bills should be 
primarily in small denominations.  
 
 
Preparation of Folders and Materials 
 
  *1.  Photocopy instructions for all participants, assistants, and observers.  (For 
research sessions, remove “T” chart examples from the Trading Rules section of the 
instructions, as indicated by the square brackets.) 
  *2.  Photocopy enough buyer and seller decision sheets, excerpted from the 
above instructions. 
  *3.  Write the buyer or seller identification numbers at the top of each decision 
sheet.  Unlike the example in section 1.3, there is probably less chance of mistaken 
identity if you use low numbers for buyers and high numbers for sellers, with no 
overlap. 
  *4.  Write the buyers' values and sellers' costs, for each unit and for each 
period, on the appropriate decision sheets. 
  *5.  Check to be sure that values and costs are recorded correctly and in the 
appropriate rows: 1 and 4 for buyers' values and 2 and 5 for sellers' costs.  For a 
more thorough check, use the subjects' own decision sheets to reconstruct the market 
supply and demand functions.  
   *6.  Make a folder for each participant with the identification number written 
on the folder and the following included: instructions, decision sheet marked with 
participant's identification number and cost or value parameters, and receipt form (if 
you are paying earnings in cash and will be reimbursed). 
  *7.  Make a folder for yourself, with a copy of the instructions to be read and 
extra copies of receipt forms for alternates.  
  *8.  Make a folder for each assistant, with instructions for all, a pad of paper 
for the person who records contracts, and, if relevant, a list of demand and cost 
parameters for the person who is to check for illegal trades (sales below cost or  
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purchases above value).  An example of such a list is given in section 1.3.  It is most 
convenient to have multiple copies of the parameter list (one for each period) so the 
assistant can mark off units as they are traded. 
    *9.  Bring extra pens for participants. 
     
Recruiting  
 
  1.  Prior to the day of the session, go to classes just at the beginning of class, 
with the instructor's prior approval, and use a prepared announcement to obtain a list 
of potential subjects.  Ask the instructor not to make a speech about experimentation 
after you finish. 
  2.  Use an announcement that is not suggestive about the type of behavior 
expected in the experiment, for example: 
 
  You are invited to participate in one or more economics experiments that 
will be conducted in the next several months at the ______ (name of 
college or university) under the supervision of Professor ______.  
  The experiment involves an economic decision-making situation, and if 
you participate, you will be paid $_.__ for appearing promptly at your 
scheduled appointment time.  In addition, you will be able to earn money 
during the session, which will last about two hours.  These earnings will 
be  determined  by  your  decisions  and  by  the  decisions  of  other 
participants.  We cannot say in advance exactly what your earnings will 
be,  but  they  will  typically  exceed  the  compensation  that  you  would 
receive for working a comparable number of hours.  All earnings will be 
paid in cash immediately after the session. 
  There will be a number of sessions, each of which will last for about two 
hours.  If you are interested in participating in one or more sessions, 
please supply the information requested below and return this sheet.  If 
you do so, someone from the Economics Department will call you later to 
arrange a specific time and place.  Thank you. 
  Your Name_____________________________ 
  Phone (day)___________________________   
      (evening, if different)___________________ 
Please indicate which times are most likely to be convenient this semester; feel 
free to indicate more than one time: 
_______________1530–1730 on a Tuesday 
_______________1530–1730 on a Wednesday  
_______________1530–1730 on a Thursday 
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  3.  When calling individuals who have expressed in interest in participation,  
identify yourself, be polite, and do not oversell, since a reluctant subject is unlikely 




  Hello, this is __________ calling from the Economics Department about 
the experiment in which you expressed an interest.  We're organizing a 
session tomorrow from __:__ to about __:__ in the afternoon (morning).  
Are you able to come?  (If not, thank them and ask if they would like to 
be  called  again.)    Do  you  have  a  pen  to  record the time and place?  
(Record the person's name on the participant list while they are going to 
get a pen.)  The experiment will be held in room ___ of _____ (building) 
at __:__p.m. (a.m.) tomorrow.  There is no need to arrive early, but we 
cannot start until everyone is present, so please come on time.  We need 
to have an exact number of people, so if you must cancel for any reason, 
please call us at _______ and leave a message saying that you will not 
come.  We always recruit a couple of extras in case someone cancels at 
the last minute.  As mentioned in the class announcement, we will pay 
everyone  $__.__ for showing up, and therefore if all of the positions are 
taken when you arrive, we will pay you this amount and call you back 
another day.  If you participate, all money that you earn in the session 
(plus the participation payment) will be paid to you in cash immediately 
afterward.  You do not need to bring anything. 
 
 
   
  4.    In  some  situations,  on-the-spot  recruiting  is  preferred  to  telephone 
recruiting.
56  To do this, divide the above recruiting announcement that is read in 
class into two parts.  There should be a place for the student's name and phone 
number on the top part (names are needed so that unexpected substitutes can be 
turned away at the time of the experiment).  The bottom part should be a tear-off part 
containing the time and place of the session.  Instruct participants that returning the 
top part with their name and phone number written in the blanks indicates their 
intention to show up on time.  It helps to confirm the details by phone with subjects 
who can be reached. 
  5.  With either method of recruiting, you should be able to answer questions in 
a  manner  that  reassures  prospective  subjects  and  arouses  interest,  without 
introducing biased expectations.  Some useful comments:  “This is not a test or an 
exam, it is not stressful.” “I cannot be more precise about how much you may earn, 
since earnings differ from person to person and from experiment to experiment.  I 
can say that most people volunteer to participate again.”  “I do not have time to 
describe the experiment in detail, and the nature of the experiment may change from 
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day to day.  Some experiments involve students taking the roles of buyers and sellers 
in a market-like situation, for example.” 
  6.  Recruit subjects in a manner that minimizes the chances of getting friends or 
roommates.  This is most easily accomplished via telephone recruiting, by calling 
individual subjects the night before the session, and using a list of phone numbers 
and names of people who had earlier expressed a general interest in participating on 
particular  weekdays  or  time  periods.    This  point  is  probably  not  important  for 
individual  decision-making  experiments  in  which  there  is  no  interaction  among 
subjects. 
  7.  Make a list of participants' names so that you can check them off at the door 
when they arrive.  In our experience, you will need to over-recruit by about 25 
percent of the number of participants needed for a session when participants are 
inexperienced.  Fewer alternates are needed if participants have had experience in a 
previous session.  More alternates may be needed if you are recruiting directly from 






  *1.   Reorganize the seats in the room, if necessary, so that it is not possible for 
participants to read numbers off of others' decision sheets. 
  *2.   Check to be sure that the blackboard is clean or prepared with the T charts 
for recording bids and asks, and check for chalk and erasers.  The T charts should be 
large enough to be read, but small enough so that lots of data can fit on the same 
blackboard. 
  *3.  When the session is being conducted for research, arrange for one of the 
experimenters to arrive about twenty minutes early to ensure that subjects who come 
early do not talk with one another. 
 
 
Starting the Session 
 
 
  1.  Devise a random device (e.g., a bowl with marked, folded pieces of paper) 
to be used to assign subjects to roles as buyer or seller.  This is particularly important 
in markets with large cost and value asymmetries. 
  2.  Ask each subject who has been assigned a position to be seated and remain 
quiet  until  the  session  begins;  proscribing  talking  facilitates  replication  and 
minimizes the effects of personal relationships.   
  3.  Have an assistant show subjects to their seats while you stay at the door to 
meet subjects.  This is a good time to distribute pens and any “consent form” that 
may be required by your university (such forms must typically be approved by a 
human subjects committee). 
 
 




  4.  Keep subjects from opening their folders before you begin to read the 
instructions.  This minimizes the possibility that subjects see the private information 
on each others' decision sheets.  
  5.    If  subjects  have  not  participated  previously,  begin  the  experiment  by 
making the initial payment and by showing them the cash that you will use to make 
payments after the session (otherwise some may have doubts about cash payments). 
  *6.    Read  the  instructions  aloud  to  the  students;  this  creates  common 
knowledge, and it will prevent boredom by ensuring that all finish at the same time.  
The instructions should not be read too quickly.  Read the instructions exactly as 
they are written.  Pause at appropriate times, for example, when subjects are asked to 
look at a different page or to write responses to questions based on an example.  To 
facilitate replication, do not insert clarifying comments or examples.  The urge to 
interject explanations is a sure sign that the instructions are too brief.    
  *7.  Repeat questions clearly before answering them.  Answers should only 
clarify the instructions.  Do not provide new information; feel free to reread the 
relevant part of the instruction or say that you cannot answer that question.  Never 
discuss the goals or anticipated outcomes. 
 
 
Controlling the Market Trading 
 
  *1.  The bids and asking prices should be written in relatively small letters and 
numbers so that the blackboard does not fill up too quickly.  Be consistent and keep 
bids on the left and asking prices on the right.  To save time, omit dollar signs and 
decimals.   Insist that participants give their role and identification number (e.g., 
Buyer 1) before submitting bids and asks.  Do not let people speak without being 
recognized, otherwise you will lose control.  To keep roles clear, you should insist 
that buyers use the word “bid” and sellers use the word “ask,” as in “Buyer 1 bids 
140” or “Seller 5 asks 180.”
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  *2.  The auctioneer should be prompted to give warnings when one minute and 
thirty seconds remain in the trading period.  The period should be stopped exactly on 
time; to do otherwise will encourage traders to delay. 
  *3.  The time between periods should be brief, say a couple of minutes.  There 
should be no talking.  If talking is a problem, explain that the instructions specify 
that participants should remain quiet at all times, as if you are just carrying out 
orders from above. 
  4.  Have an assistant in the room with subjects at all times to maintain quiet, 
especially while subjects are being paid after the session in a separate location. 
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  5.  To facilitate replication, be consistent about what remains on the chalkboard 
from one period to the next, either clean it every time or leave the same amount of 
data up from previous periods.   
  *6.  Have an assistant check earning calculations after the first period.  The 
assistant should also spot check major earning calculations throughout the session.  
Subjects are typically very honest, but it is necessary to avoid major calculation 
errors that dilute incentives.  
  7.  In the event of a major error such as trading units from the wrong period, 
remember that such errors are equivalent to undesired shifts in supply or demand, 
and therefore that the session is probably useless for any purpose other than training 
subjects for later sessions.  (It is often useful to replicate sessions using subjects who 
all have previous experience with the trading institution.)  
 
Ending the Session  
 
  1.    Ensure  that subjects leave all instructions, decision sheets, etc. in their 
folders before being paid. 
  2.  Pay subjects individually in a separate location, hallway, or visually isolated 
part of the room.  Even though the session has ended, privacy in the payment process 
is important to avoid conditions in which feelings of envy, guilt, or benevolence after 
one session may affect a subject's behavior in a subsequent session.  An assistant 
should send the subjects to you one at a time to avoid crowding around the payment 
area. 
  3.    Ensure  that  subjects  write  their  names,  social  security  numbers,  and 
signatures  on  receipt  forms  that  you  will  need  for  records  and  to  grant 
reimbursements.    Receipt  forms  should  then  be  placed  face  down  so  that  other 
subjects will not be able to see the payment amounts.  
  4.  Subjects should be able to leave the room individually without having to 
discuss earnings with others, even though you have no control over later hallway 
discussions. 
  5.    Write  a  brief  report  after  the  session  with  the  date,  names  of  persons 
present, earnings, experimental design or treatment variables, significant procedural 
errors,  and  any  salient  pattern  of  the  data.    One  of the least confusing ways to 
identify experiments is by date, unless you run more than one session on the same 
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